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TERRITORIAL COURTS AND LAW
UNIFYING FACTORS IN

THE

DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN

LEGAL INSTITUTIONS

William Wirt Blume* and Elizabeth Gaspar Brown**
Part II. INFLUENCES TENDING To UNIFY TERRITORIAL LAWf
ITH the exception of Kentucky, Vermont, Texas, California,
and West Virginia, all parts of continental United States
south and west of the present boundaries of the original states
came under colonial rule, and were governed from the national
capital through territorial governments for varying periods of
time. All territories in this area were "incorporated" in the sense
that they were destined to become states of the United States. All
became states by 1912, leaving only Alaska and Hawaii for future
statehood. Now that these territories have become states, it seems
desirable to review legal developments in all of these "incorporated" territories and to consider the territorial law that served
as a basis for state law. Existing "unincorporated" territories will
not be ignored, but in general the approach will be historicala discussion of the past without reference to the present.
That the laws in force in a territory before its admission as a
state would directly influence the constitution and laws of the
particular state seems inevitable. In fact, the first constitutions of
all of the states formed from territories, except Illinois and South
Dakota, provided that laws in force not inconsistent with the constitution should continue in force until expiration or repeal. The
constitutions of Illinois and South Dakota continued "actions,
prosecutions, claims." Some of the constitutions (Ohio, Washington, and Utah) declared that specified laws should not continue.
To the extent the laws in force in the several territories were
alike, the first laws in force in the states formed from the territories were alike. For illustration, the seventeen states formed
from territories having the standardized judicial system described
in part one of this article1 had court systems that were strikingly
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t Editor's Note.-Tbis is the second part of a two-part article with the general
title Territorial Courts and Law: Unifying Factors in the Development of American
Legal Institutions. Part I, Establishment of a Standardized Judicial System, appeared
in the November 1962 issue, 61 MICH. L. REv. 39 (1962).
1 Blume 8: Brown, Territorial Courts and Law: I, 61 MICH. L. REv. 39 (1962).
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similar. Among the influences that tended to unify the law of the
several territories, the following should be noted.
1. The principal territorial officers were appointed by the
President of the United States, the Senate consenting. Except for
some early judges who were given "good behaviour" tenure, all
were appointed for short terms and could be removed by the
President. These officers, especially the governor, were expected
to further national colonial policies.
2. Congress had exclusive power to legislate for the territories,
and in some instances served as the sole or principal legislative
agency. It enacted a "charter" for each territory, and from time
to time passed statutes applicable either to particular territories
or to all the territories alike. The organic acts ("charters") followed established patterns.
3. The Supreme Court of the United States served as the highest court of appeal for territorial (state-type) as well as federal-type
cases of all but the earliest territories.
4. The territorial legislatures were authorized to adopt or
enact statutes but were required to report them to Congress where
they might be, and sometimes were, annulled.
5. Some provisions of the federal constitution not applicable
to states did apply to the territories. For example, all incorporated
territories were required to provide jury trial for common law
civil cases involving more than 20 dollars2-a requirement continued by state constitutions. 3
6. Due to the practice of creating new territories out of old
ones, law developed in one territory was in many instances trans2 In Webster v. Reid, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 437 (1850), "an action of right" to recover
a tract of "half-breed" land, Mr. Justice McLean stated: "By the seventh article of
the amendments of the Constitution it is declared, 'In suits at common law, where
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved.' The organic law of the Territory of Iowa, by express provision
and by reference, extended the laws of the United States, including the Ordinance
of 1787, over the Territory, so far as they are applicable.
"The act under which the above proceeding was had prohibited the trial by jury
in matters of fact on which the suits were founded. In this respect the act was void."
Id. at 460.
3 In Consolidated Gold & Sapphire Mining Co. v. Struthers, 41 Mont. 565, 571, 111
Pac. 152, 155 (1910), Brantly, C.J., stated: "This court has repeatedly held that the
right guaranteed by the state Constitution (Article III, sec. 23) is the same as that
guaranteed by the federal Constitution (Seventh Amendment), because the federal
Constitution was the fundamental law of the territory at the time it was admitted
into the Union as a state, and the right as it then existed was preserved in the state
Constitution." MoNT. CoNsr. art. III, § 23 (1889) begins: "The right of trial by jury
shall be secured to all, and remain inviolate .•••" For other constitutional provisions
continuing the right to jury trial as it existed in the territories, see BLUME, AMERICAN
CIVIL PROCEDURE 370-71 (1955).
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mitted to another, and sometimes to several territories m sequence.4
7. Many persons served as officers of more than one territory,
and in moving from one territory to another carried with them
legal materials and knowledge of prior experience. 5
8. The continental territories were on the western frontier, 6
and were similarly influenced by the needs and pressures of frontier life.
LAW AND SOURCES OF LAW

For purposes of the present study three somewhat controversial
terms will be used: (1) statute law; (2) decisional law; and (3)
source of law.
I. Territorial statute law included the Constitution of the
United States, treaties made by the United States, acts of Congress,
territorial legislative acts, statutes of other governments re-enacted
by express reference, and general rules of court.
2. Territorial decisional law was made up of rules of decision
adopted by territorial courts and by federal appellate courts in
4 Illustration: From 1834 to 1836, Michigan Territory included the later territories
of Wisconsin, Iowa, Minnesota, and the eastern half of the Dakotas. ·when Wisconsin
Territory was organized (1836), Congress provided that "the existing laws" of Michigan
should be extended over Wisconsin until altered or repealed. When Iowa Territory
was created out of Wisconsin (1838), the "existing laws" of Wisconsin were likewise
continued. When Minnesota Territory was organized (1849), the laws of Wisconsin
of 1848 were continued. Codes of civil and criminal law prepared "from the Code of
Iowa" were adopted in Jefferson Territory (later Colorado) in 1859. Specified laws
of Iowa were adopted in Oregon. Beardsley, Code Making in Early Oregon, 27 P Ac.
NORTHWEST Q. 1 (1936). General laws of Oregon were "declared to be the law" in
Alaska in 1884. See Riesenfeld, Law-Making and Legislative Precedent in American
Legal History, 33 MINN. L. REv. 103, 140 (1949) where footnote 260 reads: "For instance,
most of the (revised) Statutes of the Territory of Wisconsin of 1839 are substantially
identical with the (revised) Laws of the Territory of Michigan of 1833 and the acts
passed until the separation."
5 Typical instances: Winthrop Sargent, Secretary of Northwest 1788-1798, became
the first governor of Mississippi Territory. William Henry Harrison, first governor of
Indiana Territory, was Secretary of Northwest 1798-1799. He was delegate to Congress
from Northwest at the time of his appointment as governor. John Griffin was an
Indiana territorial judge before becoming a member of the Michigan territorial court.
Frederick Bates, after serving as a Michigan territorial judge, was appointed Secretary
of Louisiana Territory. Later, he was Secretary of Missouri Territory, and still later
governor of the state. James Duane Doty, for a time clerk of the Michigan territorial
court, and "additional judge" (1824-1832), was Wisconsin's first delegate to Congress.
After serving as governor of Wisconsin Territory, he ended his career as governor of
Utah.
6 The "frontier" referred to here, and in other articles by Professor Blume dealing
with territorial law, was the line of continuous settlements shown by official census
returns through 1880. This was not a line between areas of law and no-law. Before
permitting settlement in a new area Congress would establish a territorial government,
and make provision for law and legal institutions. This was repeated many times as
the line of continuous settlements moved westward.
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territorial cases. These rules might or might not involve statute
law.
3. A source of territorial law was a system of law to which
territorial courts were directed when neither the statute nor the
decisional law provided a rule of decision. Whether legislative
acts of other sovereignties were considered statute law, decisional
law, or source of law will be noted in the course of the discussion.
1. Statute Law

Northwest Ordinance. Passed July 13, 1787,7 the Northwest
Ordinance was amended in 17898 to conform to the later-adopted
Constitution of the United States. As amended, the Ordinance
was made applicable to all territorial governments organized in
the area east of the Mississippi relinquished by Great Britain in
1783. The acts organizing the territory south of the Ohio River
(1790),9 Mississippi (1798),1° Indiana (1800),11 Michigan (1805),12
and Illinois (1809) 13 incorporated by express reference the provisions of the Ordinance relating to the form of government.
These acts and those creating Wisconsin (1836) 14 and Oregon
(1848) 15 incorporated by express reference the bill of rights (Articles) of the Ordinance except, in the southern territories, the
provision against slavery. The Iowa and Minnesota acts (1838 16
and 184911) indirectly incorporated the bill of rights by referring
to Wisconsin. The Orleans act (1805) 18 made similar reference to
Mississippi. Alabama was formed from Mississippi in 1817.10
7 Ch. 8, 1 Stat. 51 n.(a); also in 2 TERRITORIAL PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES 39
(Carter ed. 1934) [hereinafter cited TERRITORIAL PAPERS].
s Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50.
O Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 14, § 1, 1 Stat. 123.
10 Mississippi Territory Act of 1798, ch. 28, § 6, 1 Stat. 550.
11 Act of May 7, 1800, ch. 41, § 2, 2 Stat. 59.
12 Act of 1805 to Divide Indiana Territory, ch. 5, § 2, 2 Stat. 309.
13 Act of 1809 to Divide Indiana Territory, ch. 13, § 2, 2 Stat. 515.
14 Wisconsin Organic Act of 1836, ch. 54, § 12, 5 Stat. 15.
15 Oregon Organic Act of 1848, ch. 177, § 14, 9 Stat. 329.
16 Iowa Organic Act of 1838, ch. 96, § 12, 5 Stat. 239.
17 Minnesota Organic Act of 1849, ch. 121, § 12, 9 Stat. 407.
18 Ch. 23, § 2, 2 Stat. 322.
10 Alabama Organic Act of 1817, ch. 59, 3 Stat. 371. It should be noted that the
Ordinance of 1787, in addition to providing a form of government and a bill of
rights, contained detailed provisions for transfer of property, wills, descent and distribution. After pointing out in 1824 that the Ordinance had been framed mainly
from the laws of Massachusetts, especially in regard to titles, Nathan Dane wrote:
"Thus the laws of Massachusetts laid the foundation of titles to real and personal
estates, by deed, by will, and by descent, in all the territories of the Union, northwest
of the river Ohio;-and substantially in other territories to which this ordinance has
been extended." 7 DANE, A GENERAL .ABRIDGEMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW !190
(1824). That the property provisions of the Ordinance were extended to other territories
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Federal Constitution. The Ordinance of 1787 preceded the
Constitution of the United States, and the people of Northwest
and of territories formed from Northwest often referred to the
Ordinance as "our constitution." That the Constitution of the
United States was also in force in these territories was not immediately recognized. In the Louisiana Purchase, however, it was
understood from the beginning that the Constitution was in force,
the organic acts of 180420 providing that "no law shall be valid
which is inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the United
States." Similar provisions will be found in the organic acts of
Missouri (formed from the Louisiana Territory in 1812)21 and
Arkansas (formed from Missouri Territory in 1819).22
Commencing in 1850 Congress inserted in new organic acts
a provision that the Constitution of the United States should have
"the same force and effect" within the territory "as elsewhere
within the United States." This language will be found in the
organic acts of New Mexico (1850),23 Kansas (1854),24 Nebraska
(1854),2is Colorado (1861),26 Dakota (1861),27 Nevada (1861),28
Idaho (1863),29 Montana (1864),30 Wyoming (1868),31 Indian
Territory (1890),32 Oklahoma (1890),33 Hawaii (1900),34 and
Alaska (1912).3 is By the Utah act of 185036 the Constitution was
"extended over and declared to be in force in the said Territory."
The Florida organic act of 182237 contained a provision, the
same as in the early organic acts for the Louisiana area, that "no
law shall be valid which is inconsistent with the constitution and
is indicated by the fact that the Orleans Act of 1805 expressly excluded "the second
paragraph of the said Ordinance, which regulates the descent and distribution of
estates." For comments on the property provisions of the Ordinance, see Blume, Probate
and Administration on the American Frontier, 58 MICH. L. R.Ev. 209 (1959).
Orleans Organic Act of 1804, ch. 38, § 4, 2 Stat. 284.
Missouri Organic Act of 1812, ch. 95, § 4, 2 Stat. 744.
Arkansas Organic Act of 1819, ch. 49, § 5, 3 Stat. 494.
23 New Mexico Organic Act of 1850, ch. 49, § 17, 9 Stat. 452.
24 Nebraska-Kansas Act of 1854, ch. 59, § 32, IO Stat. 289.
211 Ibid.
26 Colorado Organic Act of 1861, ch. 59, § 16, 12 Stat. 176.
27 Territory of Dakota Act of 1861, ch. 86, § 16, 12 Stat. 244.
28 Nevada Organic Act of 1861, ch. 83, § 16, 12 Stat. 214.
20 Idaho Organic Act of 1863, ch. 117, § 13, 12 Stat. 813.
30 Montana Organic Act of 1864, ch. 95, § 13, 13 Stat. 91.
31 Wyoming Organic Act of 1868, ch. 235, § 16, 15 Stat. 183.
32 Oklahoma-Indian Territory Act of 1890, ch. 182, § 28, 26 Stat. 93.
33 Ibid.
34 Hawaiian Organic Act of 1900, ch. 339, § 5, 31 Stat. 141.
SIS Alaska Government Act of 1912, ch. 387, § 3, 37 Stat. 512.
S6 Utah Organic Act of 1850, ch. 51, § 17, 9 Stat. 458.
37 Ch. 13, § 5, 3 Stat. 655.
20
21
22
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laws of the United States." Commencing in 1849 the provmon
usually inserted was "the legislative power of the Territory shall
extend to all rightful subjects of legislation, consistent with the
Constitution of the United States and the provisions of this act ...."
A provision that specified territorial officers should take an
oath to support the Constitution appears in most of the organic
acts commencing in 1804. Provisions that specified territorial
courts should have jurisdiction in cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States were also usual.
In the development of territorial government it became settled
that the Constitution should have the same force within the "incorporated territories" as elsewhere within the United States. How
far it should be deemed applicable to "unincorporated territories"
became a mooted question, often considered, but still unsettled.38
United States Treaties. The acts of Congress organizing territorial governments did not expressly provide that treaties of the
United States should have force within the territories. The Constitution was made applicable, and this was all that was needed.
Statutes applicable to all the territories passed in 1885 39 and 1891 40
regulated appeals and writs of error from territorial courts to
federal appellate courts in cases involving the "validity" or "construction" of a treaty of the United States. The Canal Zone Act
of 1912 provided:
"[A]ll laws and treaties relating to the extradition of persons
accused of crime in force in the United States, to the extent
that they may not be in conflict with or superseded by any
special treaty entered into between the United States and the
Republic of Panama with respect to the Canal Zone, . . .
shall extend to and be considered in force in the Canal Zone,
and for such purposes and such purposes only the Canal Zone
38 In Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1 (1955), Mr. Justice Frankfurter
observed: "A vital distinction was made between 'incorporated' and 'unincorporated'
territories. The first category had the potentialities of statehood like unto continental
territories. The United States Constitution, including the Bill of Rights, fully applied
to an 'incorporated' territory. See, e.g., Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 25
S. Ct. 514, 49 L. Ed. 862. The second category described possessions of the United States
not thought of as future States. To these only some essentials, withal undefined, of the
Constitution extended. See, e.g., Balzac v. People of Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 42 S. Ct.
343, 66 L. Ed. 627. The incidence of the differentiation fell in two areas: (a) the right
of the individual to trial by jury and similar protections, e.g., Balzac v. People of Porto
Rico, supra; (b) the right of the Federal Government to tax territorial products on a
nonuniform basis, e.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 21 S. Ct. 770, 45 L. Ed. 1088."
Id. at 5.
39 Act of March 3, 1885, ch. 355, § 2, 23 Stat. 443.
40 Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891, ch. 517, §§ 5, 15, 26 Stat. 827, 830.
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shall be considered and treated as an organized Territory of
the United States . . . ." 41
In 1807 the Supreme Court of Michigan held that the property
provisions of Jay's Treaty (concluded in 1794, proclaimed in
1796) protected property rights in slaves despite the anti-slavery
provision of the Northwest Ordinance made applicable to Michigan in 1805.42
Acts of Congress. The power of Congress to "make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States"43 was exercised in three ways:
(1) by enacting statutes for particular territories or all territories
alike; (2) by extending statutes enacted for the country at large
to all or to particular territories; and (3) by delegating to a territorial legislature the power to adopt laws for the territory.
Commencing in 1850 new organic acts provided that "all laws
of the United States which are not locally inapplicable, shall have
the same force and effect within the said Territory ... as elsewhere
within the United States."44 Many organic acts before and after
1850 specified some or all of the acts of Congress that were to be
considered in force, or not in force. The most extensive lists will
be found in the organic acts for the Louisiana area (1804) 45 and
for Florida (1822). 46 In 1849 "the revenue laws of the United
States" were "extended to and over the main land and waters of
all that portion of territory ... known as Upper California." 47
Other types of provisions showing that "applicable" laws of Congress were in force were those requiring that local territorial laws
be consistent with the laws of the United States; requiring oaths
to support the laws of the United States; and conferring jurisdiction of causes arising under the laws of the United States.
State Statutes. The organic act (1790) for the area south of
the Ohio later known as Tennessee provided that the laws of
North Carolina should continue in force in the Territory until
altered or repealed. 48 In 1884, the "general laws of the State of
41 Ch. 390, § 12, 37 Stat. 569.
42 Opinion by Woodward, C.J., recorded in the court's journal, printed in I
TRANSACTIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 1805-1814, at
385-95 (Blume ed. 1935).
48 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
44 E.g., New Mexico Organic Act of 1850, ch. 49, § 17, 9 Stat. 452; Utah Organic Act
of 1850, ch. 51, § 17, 9 Stat. 458.
41S Orleans Organic Act of 1804, ch. 38, § 7, 2 Stat. 285 (listing twenty-one acts).
46 Florida Organic Act of 1822, ch. 13, § 9, 3 Stat. 657 (listing twenty-four acts).
47 Act of March 3, 1849, ch. 112, § 1, 9 Stat. 400.
48 Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 14, § 1, I Stat. 123, incorporating conditions of Act of
April 2, 1790, ch. 6, 1 Stat. 106.
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Oregon" were declared to be the law of Alaska so far as applicable and not inconsistent with the laws of the United States.411
Specified "general laws of the State of Arkansas" were made applicable to Indian Territory in 1890.50 At the same time specified
"Laws of the State of Nebraska," so far as locally applicable and
not in conflict with the laws of the United States, were "extended
to and put in force in the Territory of Oklahoma" until after
the first session of the legislature. 51
Territorial Statutes. Each completely organized territory was
provided with a legislative agency to which Congress delegated
power to adopt or enact statutes for the territory. 52 The extent of
the legislative power of these agencies will be noted later. 53 Acts
of these agencies constituted substantial bodies of statute law.G 4
When Indiana was formed from Northwest in 1800, it was assumed that the general statutes of Northwest continued in force. 65
In Michigan the opposite was assumed, until the Supreme Court
held in 1806 that the general statutes of Indiana (including those
received by Indiana from Northwest) were in force. 56 In 1810,
however, all prior territorial statutes were repealed. 57 Altogether
twelve territories were formed from pre-existing territories, and
in each instance the laws of the older territory were continued
in force:
49 Act Providing Civil Government for Alaska, ch. 53, § 7, 23 Stat. 25 (1884).
50 Oklahoma-Indian Territory Act of 1890, ch. 182, § 31, 26 Stat. 94-.
51 Oklahoma-Indian Territory Act of 1890, ch. 182, § 11, 26 Stat. 87.
52 Governor and judges: Northwest 1787-1798; South of river Ohio 1790-1794;
Mississippi 1798-1800; Indiana 1800-1804; Louisiana (north of Orleans) 1804-1812;
Michigan 1805-1823; Illinois 1809-1812; Arkansas 1819. Governor and council: Orleans
1804-1805; Florida 1822-1845; Michigan 1823-1836. Legislature (governor, council, and
representatives): Northwest 1799-1802; South 1794-1796; Mississippi 1800-1817; Indiana
1804-1816; Orleans 1805-1812; Missouri 1812-1821; Illinois 1812-1818; Alabama 1817•
1819; Arkansas 1819-1836. Governor and legislature (council and representatives): Wis•
consin 1836-1848; Iowa 1838-1846; Minnesota 1849-1858; New Mexico 1850-1912; Utah
1850-1896; Kansas 1854-1861; Nebraska 1854-1867; Colorado 1861-1876; Nevada 18611864; Dakota 1861-1889; Idaho 1863-1890; Montana 1864-1889; Wyoming 1868-1890;
Oklahoma 1890-1907. Legislature (council or senate and representatives): Oregon 1848·
1859; Washington 1853-1889; Arizona 1863-1912; Alaska 1912-1959; Puerto Rico 1900·
1952; Hawaii 1900-1959; Philippines 1902-1935. Legislature (one house): Guam 1950--;
Virgin Islands 1954-.
53 See text at 523-31 infra.
54 See descriptions of laws adopted by governor and judges of Northwest 1788-1798;
Indiana 1800-1804; and Michigan 1805-1823 in Blume, Legislation on the American
Frontier, 60 MICH. L. REv. 317 (1962).
55 1 COURTS AND LAWYERS OF INDIANA 22 (Monks ed. 1916); LAws OF INDIANA T.EIUU•
TORY 1801-1809, at cii-cvi (Philbrick ed. 1930).
56 United States v. Muir (1806), reported in 1 TRANSAcrIONS OF THE SUPREME CoUllT
OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 1805-1814, at 58 (Blume ed. 1935).
57 1 LAws OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 900 (reprint 1871).

1963]

TERRITORIAL COURTS AND LAW

475

Indiana from Northwest (1800)
Michigan from Indiana (1805)
Illinois from Indiana (1809)
Missouri from Louisiana (north of Orleans) (1812)
Alabama from Mississippi (1817)
Arkansas from Missouri (1819)
Wisconsin from Michigan (1836)
Iowa from Wisconsin (1838)
Minnesota from Wisconsin (1849)
Washington from Oregon (1853)
Arizona from New Mexico (1863)
Wyoming from Dakota (1868)

General Court Rules. In 1800 the General Assembly of Northwest made it the duty of the judges of the General Court "to compile a system of rules for the government of the general and circuit
courts." 58 The act recited that it was passed "for the purpose of
establishing and maintaining an uniformity in the practice of the
several courts throughout the territory." 59 The rules were to be
consistent with "the constitution, laws and ordinances of the
United States and the acts of this territory." In the later territories
grant of rule-making power to the highest court was usual, but
in most instances the court was not authorized to make rules for
other courts. 60 In all instances the rules were to be consistent with
federal and territorial legislative acts. "A Digest of the Rules of
the Supreme Court of the Territory of Michigan" was published
in 1821.61 In 1863 the Supreme Court of the United States held
that a territorial court sitting in chancery was governed by the
same statutes and court rules as governed the federal courts. 62 This
was overruled in 1874,63 but whether a territorial court sitting to
try federal-type cases was governed by federal rules was left undecided. In Washington it was held in 1877 " ... that the rules
in admiralty, promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United
States as far as they can be applied, are to regulate the procedure
in cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction in the courts of
this Territory." 64
58 1 STATUTES OF OHIO AND OF THE NORTHWESTERN TERRITORY 307 (Chase ed. 1833).
59 Ibid.
60 Territorial provisions for rule-making have been assembled by Mrs. Brown, and

appear in Laws in Force in the Territories of the United States 1787-1912 (unpublished
mimeograph in the University of Michigan Law Library, 1955).
61 Reprinted in 2 TRANSAcrIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF
MICHIGAN 1814-1824, at 515-32 (Blume ed. 1938).
62 Orchard v. Hughes, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 73 (1863).
63 Hornbuckle v. Toombs, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 648 (1874).
64 Phelps v. S.S. City of Panama, 1 Wash. Terr. 518, 530 (1877).
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Acts of Temporary Governments. The governments of all "incorporated" territories were "temporary" in the sense that sooner
or later the territories would become states. As here employed, the
term "temporary" is used to describe military and other interim
governments which preceded governments of the type provided
by the Northwest Ordinance. Temporary governments were provided by the United States for:
Louisiana (1803-1804)
Florida (1821-1822)
New Mexico (1846-1850)
Hawaii (1898-1900)
Philippines (1898-1901)
Puerto Rico (1898-1900)
Guam (1898-1950)
Samoa (1900--)
Canal Zone (1904--)
Virgin Islands (1917-1936)
Trust Territory (1947--)
In addition to the military and other interim governments established by the United States, temporary or provisional governments
were set up by the inhabitants of:
Oregon (1846-1848)
Deseret (1849-1851)
Jefferson (1859-1861)
The act of Congress organizing Oregon as a territory (1848) provided that the laws of the provisional government should continue
in force. 65 The first legislature of the territory of Utah (1851) declared "that the laws heretofore passed by the provisional government of the State of Deseret," not in conflict with the organic act,
were "legal" and should remain in force. 66
In this connection, attention is called to acts of Congress (1866
and 1872) 67 authorizing exploration and occupation of mineral
lands of the public domain subject to "the local customs or rules
of miners in the several mining districts." The Act of 1872 further
provided that:
65 Oregon Organic Act of 1848, ch. 177, § 14, 9 Stat. 329.
66 For pre-territorial developments in Utah, see The State of Deseret 1847-1849, in 8
UTAH HISTORICAL Q. 67 (1940). For details of pre-territorial military governments, see
THOMAS, A HISTORY OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN NEWLY ACQUIRED TERRITORY OF THE
UNITED STATES (1904).
67 Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, § 1, 14 Stat. 251; Act of May 10, 1872, ch. 152, § 1,
17 Stat. 91.
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"[T]he miners of each mining district may make rules and
regulations not in conflict with the laws of the United States,
or with the laws of the State or Territory in which the district is situated, governing the location, manner of recording,
amount of work necessary to hold possession of a miningclaim, subject to the following requirements . . . " 68

2. Decisional Law
Each territorial government of the type provided by the Northwest Ordinance included at least three judges appointed by the
national government. These judges constituted the highest court
of the territory, and had jurisdiction of both state-type and federaltype cases. Appeals to federal appellate courts were allowed-at
first, in cases which concerned the United States; later, in statetype cases involving fixed jurisdictional amounts. The several
territorial governments commenced operations with the statutory
law outlined above but without common law of any kind. The
latter had to be built up item by item through court decisions.
Judge Sibley of Michigan once remarked:
"The courts are constantly drawing from the same fountain in aid of their adjudications or questions as they ariseThe right to draw upon the common law is admitted, and
may be carried to the extent of introducing the entire body
of that Law, if the interest and convenience of the new society
require it." 69
How far the courts of any one territory went in introducing
law other than statutory law cannot be determined from the materials which have survived. 70
3. Source of Law
Quebec Act (1774 ). The Quebec Act of 1774 provided that the
area later organized as the Northwest Territory should be annexed
to and made part and parcel of the Province of Quebec, and
68 Act of May 10, 1872, ch. 152, § 5, 17 Stat. 92. See SHINN, MINING CA.MPs-A STUDY
IN AMERICAN FRONTIER GOVERNMENT (reprint 1948).
69 Chene v. Campau (1828), reported in 1 TRANSACTIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 1825-1836, at 305, 311 (Blume ed. 1940).
70 There are no reports of cases decided in the early territories. Even the records
of the Northwest General Court have disappeared. Diligent efforts made some years ago
to locate opinions delivered by the judges of the Michigan Supreme Court (1805-1836)
uncovered some one hundred opinions, but there was no assurance that all, or approximately all, had been discovered. The judges, it seems, would deliver oral opinions from
notes or from completely written manuscripts. In some instances written opinions were
recorded in the court's journal; a few were deposited in the court's files; a few were
published in local newspapers. Usually, the judge retained his notes or manuscript
with his own personal papers.
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"in all Matters of Controversy, relative to Property and
Civil Rights, Resort shall be had to the Laws of Canada, as
the Rule for the Decision of the same; and all Causes that
shall hereafter be instituted in any of the Courts of Justice,
to be appointed within and for the said Province ... shall,
with respect to such Property and Rights be determined
agreeably to the said Laws and Customs of Canada, until
they shall be varied or altered by any Ordinance that shall,
from Time to Time, be passed in the said Province . . . .
"[I]t shall and may be lawful to and for every Person that
is Owner of any Lands, Goods, or Credits, in the said province, and that has a Right to alienate the said Lands, Goods,
or Credits, in his or her Lifetime, by Deed of Sale, Gift, or
otherwise, to devise and bequeath the same at his or her
Death, by his or her last Will and Testament; any Law,
Usage, or Custom, heretofore or now prevailing in the Province, to the Contrary hereof in any-wise notwithstanding;
such Will being executed, either according to the Laws of
Canada, or according to the Forms prescribed by the Laws
of England.
"And whereas the Certainty and Lenity of the Criminal
Law of England, and the Benefits and Advantages resulting
from the Use of it, have been sensibly felt by the Inhabitants,
from an Experience of more than Nine Years, during which
time it has been uniformly administered; be it therefore
further enacted .... That the same shall continue to be administered, and shall be observed as Law in the Province
of Quebec, as well in the Description and Quality of the
Offence as in the Method of Prosecution and Trial; and the
Punishments and Forfeitures thereby inflicted to the Exclusion of every other Rule of Criminal Law, or Mode of
Proceeding thereon...." 71
Northwest 1788-1802. The Northwest Ordinance (1787) 72 conferred on the superior judges "a common law jurisdiction," and
declared that the inhabitants of the Territory should "always be
entitled to the benefits of ... judicial proceedings according to the
course of the common law," saving "to the French and Canadian
inhabitants, and other settlers of the Kaskaskies, Saint Vincents, and
the neighbouring villages" who had theretofore professed themselves citizens of Virginia, "their laws and customs now in force
71 Quebec Act of 1774, 14 Geo. 3, c. 83. For the "Laws and Customs of Canada,"
referred to in the act, see AN .ABSTRACT OF THOSE p ARTS OF THE CUSTOM OF THE VIS•
COUNTY PROVOSTSHIP OF PARIS, WHICH WERE RECEIVED AND PRACTICED IN THE PROVINCE
OF QUEBEC, IN THE TIME OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT (1772).

72

Ch. 8, 1 Stat. 51 n.(a).
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among them, relative to descent and conveyance of property." 73
The "laws and customs" referred to were those of Canada made applicable to the northwest area by the Quebec Act of I 774, including those parts of the Custom of Paris which had been in
force in Canada under the French. How long these "laws and
customs" were to be in force in the territories organized in the
northwest area is not stated. Governor St. Clair of Northwest understood they were to continue only until territorial property
laws were adopted or made.74
In a report to President Washington (1789) the Governor,
after describing settlements made and to be made in Northwest,
observed:
"Laws that are to run thro' so great an extent of Country,
and are to operate upon People who have very many different
Habits and Customs require to be very attentively considered;
and it would seem that they should be composed rather of an
intermixture of those of all the original states, than that the
acts of any one particular state should be adopted." 75
His views as to what "common law" should guide the legal operations of the judges had been expressed a year earlier. 76 It was his
opinion that the common law of England, insofar as it had not
been altered by statute prior to the Revolution, or by the laws
of the colonies before that period, or by law of the states afterwards, was the common law of the land. As to English statutes
which had altered the common law, the governor was of the opinion that if such statutes had been adopted in the colonies and had
not been abrogated in the states after the Revolution, they continued to be the law. The superior judges had been discussing
"the common law, as adopted in the States, while colonies." 77
In 1795 the governor and judges as a legislature adopted a
statute which provided:
"The common law of England, all statutes or acts of the
British parliament made in aid of the common law, prior
Ibid.
74 Letter of Oct. 7, 1795, to Probate Judges William St. Clair and John Edgar, 3
TERRITORIAL PAPERS 443.
711 Letter of Aug. 1789, to the President, 2 TERRITORIAL PAPERS 204, 206.
76 Letter of Aug. 2, 1788, to Judges Parsons and Varnum, 3 TERRITORIAL PAPERS 272,
276; 2 THE ST. CLAIR PAPERS 72, 76 (Smith ed. 1882).
77 Letter to Gov. St. Clair, 2 THE ST. CLAIR PAPERS 71 (Smith ed. 1882): "Were we
to be confined for any length of time to the principles of the common law, we are
fearful of very precarious consequences. The common law, as adopted in the States,
while colonies, entered essentially into the principles of monarchial government, and
therefore cannot, with propriety, be applied here."
73
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to the fourth year of the reign of King James the first (and
which are of a general nature, not local to that kingdom)
and also the several laws in force in this Territory, shall be
the rule of decision, and shall be considered, as of full force,
until repealed by legislative authority, or disapproved of by
congress." 78
This was the Virginia Ordinance of 177679 which had been repealed in 179280 after a program initiated by Jefferson had resulted in a rewriting of all British statutes whose retention was
deemed desirable.81 In 1799 Governor St. Clair suggested that all
British statutes that were in force in the colonies down to the time
of the Revolution should be declared the laws of the Northwest
Territory. 82
By the law adopted in 1795 no particular British statute was
made a Northwest statute. Without further specification by the
legislature, the courts were to decide in cases before them what
British statutes should be applied. The legislature did not reenact British statutes deemed desirable, nor did it undertake to
list the statutes to be applied, but did pass the following acts: 83

November 15, 1789: Repeals law of 1795 insofar as it enforces
13 Eliz. 1, c. 8, and 37 Hen. 8, c. 9, re usury.
December 2, 1799: Repeals law of 1795 insofar as it adopts
and enforces 43 Eliz. 1, c. 6, § 2, re costs in actions for less
than 40s.
December 6, 1800: Repeals law of 1795 insofar as it "adopts
78 1 THE STATUTES OF Omo AND OF THE NORTHWESTERN TERRITORY 190 (Chase ed.
1833) [hereinafter cited as CHASE]; LAws OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORY 1788-1800, at
253 (Pease ed. 1925) [hereinafter cited as PEASE].
79 This ordinance reads: "[T]he common law of England, all statutes or acts of
Parliament made in aid of the common law prior to the fourth year of the reign of
King James the first, and which are of a general nature, not local to that kingdom,
together with the several acts of the General Assembly of this colony now in force, so
far as the same may consist with the several ordinances, declarations, and resolutions of
the General Convention, shall be the rule of decision, and shall be considered as in
full force, until the same shall be altered by the legislative power of this colony." 1
THE REvISED CODE OF THE LAws OF VIRGINIA 135 (1819).
80 Id. at 137. After reciting that "the good people of this Commonwealth may be
ensnared by an ignorance of acts of parliament, which have never been published in
any collection of the laws," the General Assembly enacted: "That so much of the above
recited ordinance as relates to any statute or act of parliament, shall be, and is hereby
repealed; and that no such statute or act of parliament shall have any force or
authority within this Commonwealth." Ibid.
81 For The Revisal of the Laws 1776-1786, see 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
305-665 (Boyd ed. 1950).
82 2 THE ST. CLAIR PAPERS 456 (Smith ed. 1882).
83 See 1 CHASE 218, 238, 293; PEASE 353, 401. See also OHIO UNREPORTED JUDICIAL
DECISIONS PRIOR TO 1823, at 211 (Pollack ed. 1952).
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statutes that come within the purview of this act," re maintenance and support of illegitimate children.
That English law was to be the source of Northwest decisional
law was clear; but the question was whether it should be law in
force in England, or English law as adopted in the colonies and
original states. Though Governor St. Clair signed the law of 1795,
he preferred American common law of 1776 to that of England of
1607, and visualized an "intermixture" of the laws of all the states.
But by selecting the English law of 1607 the difficulty of trying to
determine what law had been developed in each of the original
colonies and states could be avoided. Equipped with books on
English law, judges and lawyers began the process of developing
an American common law that was unrelated to the common law
of the colonies and original states.
The first constitution of Ohio-created out of Northwest in
1802-declared that "all laws, and parts of laws, now in force in
this territory, not inconsistent with this constitution, shall continue and remain in full effect until repealed by the Legislature"
except specified statutes dealing with attorneys.84 In 1804 the
legislature repealed the Northwest act of 1795 (Virginia Ordinance of 1776), enacting in its place a statute that was substantially
the same.85 The latter was repealed in 1806.86 That this repeal
eliminated all British statutes except those so incorporated into
the common law "as to have become part and parcel of the system" was held by the Supreme Court of Ohio· in 1848.87 That the
repeal also eliminated the common law was argued in a book
published in 1819.88 Holding the other way in 1817 the court of
Common Pleas had referred to the Articles of Compact of the
Northwest Ordinance as being of "perpetual obligation." 89
84 Omo CoNsr., § 4 of the Schedule (1802).
85 1 CHASE 484 (1804 ed.), and id. at 512 (1805 ed.).
80 l id. 528 (1805 ed.).
87 Crawford v. Chapman, 17 Ohio St. 449, 453 (1848).
88 GOODENOW, HISTORICAL SKETCHES OF THE PRINCIPLES A..'ID ?i.fAx.IMS OF AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE IN CONTRAsr WITH THE DOCTRINES OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAw ON THE
SUBJECT OF CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (1819). In the preface Goodenow stated: "I have
intended to establish these positions: that the common law of England had its origin,
and received its impression and 'perfection' even down to the time when our ancestors
left England, in dark, uncultivated and barbarous ages; suited to an ignorant and
blood-thirsty people; under the tutilage of turbulent, haughty, sacrilegious tyrants
and dictators; that as a code, separate from STATUTE LAW, it is without beauty,
symmetry, or even shape; undefinable and immeasureable; bloody in its maxims; in•
human in its policy; and entirely diverse and repugnant to the philosophy and christian
refinement of this country."
89 Ohio v. Lafferty, Tappan's Ohio R. 81 (1817). Judge Tappan observed that
common law had been "modified and adapted to various forms of government; as the
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South of Ohio (1790-1796). In the act organizing a territorial
government for the area south of the Ohio (later Tennessee) ceded
to the United States by North Carolina, Congress incorporated
by reference a provision of the deed of cession90 that "the laws
in force and use in the State of North Carolina, at the time of
passing this act, shall be, and continue in full force within the
territory hereby ceded, until the same shall be repealed, or otherwise altered by the legislative authority of the said territory." 91
Among the laws continued in force was an act passed in I 71592
declaring that the common law (except writ practice) and English
statutes dealing with specified subjects were in force, and an act
passed in 177893 declaring in force all statutes and parts of the
common law formerly in force and use, or such parts as were
not inconsistent with the principles and form of government.
In 1805 the Supreme Court of Tennessee pointed out that construction of the act of 1715 "depended very much upon usage
and the decisions of the superior courts"; and that "information
on this subject is wanting." 94 The court also found it impossible
to give a "satisfactory opinion" with respect to what parts of the
statutes of England were "in force and use" prior to the act of
1778. The court did find it possible to specify which English statutes were not inconsistent with the principles and form of government. Giving effect to this alternative of the act of 1778, the court
declared that "the statutes contemplated by the act, were those
which were passed previously to the fourth year of Jae. 1st. when
the charter to the colony of Virginia was granted, which included,
what was afterwards called North-Carolina."
Mississippi (1798-1817). By the organic act of 1798°5 the people of Mississippi (south of Tennessee) were to "enjoy all and
singular the rights, privileges and advantages" granted to the
people of Northwest by the Ordinance of 1787, including "judicial proceedings according to the course of the common law." 96
As was true of the Northwest, Congress did not specify what
different orders of architecture, having their foundation in utility and graceful proportion, rise in various forms of symmetry, and beauty, in accordance with the taste and
judgment of the builder." Id. at 83. GoonENow, op. cit. supra note 88, was written to
refute the Lafjerty case.
90 Act of 1790 to Accept a Cession of North Carolina Claims, ch. 6, I Stat. 106.
Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 14, § I, I Stat. 123.
LAws OF NORTH CAROLINA 17 (Iredell ed. 1791).
93 Id. at 353.
94 Glasgow's Lessee v. Smith &: Blackwell, I Tenn. (Overton) 144, 153 (1805).
95 Mississippi Territory Act of 1798, ch. 28, § 6, I Stat. 550.
96 Northwest Ordinance of 1787, ch. 8, I Stat. 51 n.(a).
91
92
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"common law" should be the rule of decision, leaving this to be
worked out by the territorial government. In 1807, after Judge
Toulmin had included in a digest of the territorial law a selection
of English statutes, the territorial Assembly declared that "all
laws of the Governor and Judges, all the acts of the General Assembly of the Mississippi Territory, and all statutes of England
and Great-Britain, not contained in the said volume of statutes,
shall cease to have any force or validity in this territory." 97 In
1849 the Supreme Court of the State of Mississippi observed:
"When the Mississippi territory was organized, the ordinance secured the inhabitants in the enjoyment of judicial
proceedings, according to the course of the common law.
. . . This, together with the provision in the constitution
[continuing in force territorial laws], has been considered
to exclude all English statutes, and to adopt only the common law, and the statutes of our own government. . . ." 98
In a later case (1856) it was said: "As early as the year 1807, all
the statutes of England and Great Britain not re-enacted, were, by
express enactment of the legislature, excluded from operation
within the territory." 09 In a much later case (1906) it was said:
"English statutes have no force in this state since the act of
1807 .... Even the common law has no force where not adapted
to 'our institutions and circumstances.' " 100 The court held that
the particular common law to be applied in the case was the "ancient" common law as it existed prior to the first English statute
changing it. On rehearing this view was repudiated, the court
holding that a principle of liability first announced in an English
statute not re-enacted in Mississippi could be applied by the courts
as part of the English common law.
Indiana (1800-1816). The act101 creating Indiana out of Northwest (1800) incorporated by reference the provisions of the Northwest Ordinance (1787) conferring "common law jurisdiction"
to be exercised "according to the course of the common law."
After a short period of doubt,1°2 it was recognized that the laws of
MISSISSIPPI TERRITORY 19 (Toulmin ed. 1807).
Boarman v. Catlett, 21 Miss. (13 S. &: M.) 149, 152 (1849).
oo Jordan v. Roach, 32 Miss. 481, 616 (1856).
100 Moss Point Lumber Co. v. Harrison County, 89 Miss. 448, 505-06, 42 So. 290,
293 (1906).
101 Act of May 7, 1800, ch. 41, § 2, 2 Stat. 59.
102 See letter of Aug. 26, 1800, from Secretary of State Marshall to President Adams,
7 TERRITORIAL PAPERS 18.
97 STATUTES OF

98
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Northwest continued in force103 including the act of 1795 (Virginia Ordinance of 1776) and the repeals of 1799104 declaring
what English law should be "the rule of decision." In 1801 the
English statutes of Jeofails as of 1752 were declared to be in
force. 105 In 1807106 the legislature re-enacted the Northwest statute
of 1795 excepting the English statutes repealed in 1799.107 In
1814 the legislature called on Congress to clarify the term "common law" as used in the Northwest Ordinance, saying:
"If it should be determined that, by the expression of
the ordinance, a common law jurisdiction should be located
on the common law of England, it is essential to define to
what extent of that common law the judges shall take cognizance; whether the whole extent of feudal and gothic
customs of England; whether the customs, or unwritten law
shall be taken with the statute law, and that to form the common law to govern the judges; or whether the unwritten
and statute law is to be taken in contradistinction to the
laws, customs, and rules of chancery; or whether it includes
that law which is common to all." 108

Failure of Congress to comply with this request, coupled with
its failure to disapprove the acts of Northwest and Indiana based
on the1 Virginia Ordinance of 1776, indicated a willingness on the
part of Congress to leave the matter to the local government.
After the first constitution of Indiana (1816) had continued
in force "all laws and parts of law now in force in this Territory,"109 the state legislature re-enacted the territorial law of 1807
(originally the Virginia Ordinance of 1776).110 This re-enactment
was declared in force in 1838111 and appears in the present statutes.112 "But," stated the Supreme Court in 1914,113 "this provision
of our law has not had the effect of making English statutes, passed
subsequent to 1607, a part of the body of our law."
103

See note 55 supra.
The English statutes "repealed" in 1799 were: 37 Hen. 8, c. 9 (1545) (relating to
usury); 13 Eliz. 1, c. 8 (1571) (relating to usury); 43 Eliz. 1, c. 6, § 2 (1601) (relating
to frivolous suits).
105 LAws OF INDIANA TERRITORY 1801-1809, at 7 (Philbrick ed. 1930). This act was
repealed in 1803. Id. at 64.
106 Id. at 323.
107 See note 104 supra.
10s ANNALS OF CONG., 13th Cong., 3d Sess. 401 (1854).
109 IND. CONST. art. 12, § 4 (1816).
110 THE REvISED LAws OF INDIANA 256 (1824).
111 THE REVISED STATUTES OF THE STATE OF INDIANA 398 (1838).
112 The statutes listed in note 104 supra are listed as exceptions in the present statute.
113 State v. Home Brewing Co., 182 Ind. 75, 79-80, 105 N.E. 909, 911 (1914).
104
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Orleans (1804-1812). The organic act of 1804,114 after providing for habeas corpus and trial by jury, declared that "the laws
in force in the said territory" should continue until modified or
repealed. This act was amended in 1805115 by adding that the inhabitants of the Territory should be "entitled to and enjoy all
the rights, privileges, and advantages secured by the said ordinance [of 1787], and now enjoyed by the people of Mississippi
territory." That the latter provision had the effect of making
English common law the rule of decision was strongly argued,
but not sustained. 116 Following the precedent of the Quebec Act, 111
the territorial legislature in 1805 made the English common law
the rule of decision for criminal cases,118 and declared that other
cases were to be determined by reference to:
"I. The roman Civil code, as being the foundation of
the spanish law, by which this country was governed before
its cession by France and to the United States, which is composed of the institutes, digest and code of the emperor Justinian, aided by the authority of the commentators of the civil
law, and particularly of Domat in his treaty of the Civils
laws; the whole so far as it has not been derogated from by
the spanish law;
"2. The Spanish law, consisting of the books of the recopilation de Castilla and autos acordados being nine books
in the whole; the seven parts or partidas of the king Don
Alphonse the learned, and the eight books of the royal statute
(fueroreal) of Castilla; the recopilation de indias, save what
is therein relative to the enfranchisement of Slaves, the laws
de Toro, and finally the ordinances and royal orders and
decrees, which have been formally applied to the colony of
Louisiana, but not otherwise; the whole aided by the authority of the reputable commentators admitted in the course of
Justice....
"[T]hat in matters of commerce the ordinance of Bilbao
is that which has full authority in this Territory, to decide
all contestations relative thereto; and that wherever it is not
sufficiently explicit, recourse may be had to the roman laws;
to Beawes lex mercatoria, to Park on insurance, to the treatise
of the insurences by Emorigon, and finally to the commenOrleans Organic Act of 1804, ch. 38, § 13, 2 Stat. 287.
Act of March 2, 1805, ch. 23, § 1, 2 Stat. 322.
See Blume, Territorial Courts and Law: I, 61 MrcH. L. REV. 39, 53 (1952).
See text accompanying note 70 supra.
Statute of May 4, 1805, § 33, an act of the legislature of the Territory of Orleans,
quoted in State v. McCoy, 8 Rob. 545, 547 (La. 1844).
114
115
116
117
118
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taries of Valin, and to the respectable authors consulted in
the United States." 119
The quoted act was disapproved by Governor Claiborne May 26,
1806. In a letter to the Secretary of State explaining his veto the
Governor remarked: "The Judges of the Superior Court can determine the authorities on which to rely. Their selection would likely
be more judicious than any which the legislature could make." 120
The legislature, however, did not see fit to leave the matter to the
judiciary but proceeded to formulate and adopt a complete civil
code.121
In 1827, after Orleans had become the state of Louisiana, the
Supreme Court found it necessary to decide a civil matter not
covered by the Code.122 In the course of a long opinion Mr. Justice
Porter referred to provisions of the Fuero Real (1255) and Partidas (1260) of Spain, and the views of leading commentators as
to their meaning. He observed:
"This jurisprudence, or common law, in some nations,
is found in the decrees of their courts; in others, it is furnished by private individuals, eminent for their learning
and integdty, whose superior wisdom has enabled them to
gain the proud distinction of legislating, for their country,
and enforcing their legislation by the most noble of all
means:-that of reason alone." 123
In 1844, after quoting the territorial statute of 1805 "which
introduced the common law in all criminal matters," the state
court held:
i10 Set out in Franklin, The Place of Thomas Jefferson in the Expulsion of Spanish
Medieval Law from Louisiana, 16 TuL. L. REV. 319, 323-26 (1942). See also Brown,
Legal Systems in Conflict: Orleans Territory 1804-1812, l AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 35, 47 (1957).
120 3 MISSISSIPPI TERRITORIAL ARCHIVES, OFFICIAL LEITER BOOKS OF Gov.
c. C.
CLAIBORNE 1801-1816, at 309 (Rowland ed. 1917).
121 See Brown, supra note 119, at 54-56. The act promulgating the Code of 1808
stated: "Whereas, in the confused state in which civil laws of this territory were
plunged, by the effect of the changes which happened in its government, it had become
indispensable to make known the laws which have been preserved after the abrogation
of those which were contrary to the Constitution of the United States, or irreconcileable
with its principles, and to collect them in a single work, which might serve as a guide
for the decision of the courts and juries, without recurring to a multiplicity of books,
which, being for the most part written in foreign languages, offer in their interpretation
inexhaustible sources of litigation." Id. at 54. Article IV, § 11, of the first state constitution
of Louisiana (1812) provided: "The existing laws of this territory, when this constitution goes into effect, shall continue to be in force until altered or abolished by the
legislature; provided, however, that the legislature shall never adopt any system or
code of laws, by a general reference to the said system or code, but in all cases, shall
specify the several provisions of the laws it may enact."
122 Saul v. His Creditors, 5 Martin (N.S.) 569 (La. 1827).
123 Id. at 582.

,v.
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"We concur with the counsel in believing that the Legislature, in adopting the common law rules of proceeding,
method of trial, &c., adopted the system as it existed in 1805,
modified, explained and perfected by statutory enactments,
so far as those enactments are not found to be inconsistent
with the peculiar character and genius of our government
and institutions." 124
English statutes altering the common law passed in 1548125 and
1728-1729126 were considered a part of the common law referred
to in the act of 1805..
Louisiana (North of Orleans) (1804-1812). The organic acts
of 1804127 and 1805128 continued in force the prior laws-the
same laws as were in force in Orleans when that territory was
organized. Under the act of 1804 Louisiana was a district to be
administered by the Governor and judges of Indiana. In 1805
the district became a territory with its own officers. The judges
were given the same jurisdiction as the judges of Indiana, viz.,
the "common law jurisdiction" originally conferred by the Northwest Ordinance (1787).
In the period before 1812, when the name of the territory
was changed from Louisiana to Missouri, two statutes were passed
which indicated an inclination to make common law the rule of
decision, at least in matters of procedure:
[1807] The rules of common law respecting evidence as
adopted by the courts of the United States having common
law jurisdiction shall govern the decisions of the courts of
this territory in like cases.129
·
[I 81 OJ In all cases where a remedy cannot be had in the
ordinary course of the common law proceeding, the General
Court shall exercise a chancery jurisdiction.130
State v. McCoy, 8 Rob. 545, 547 (La. 1844).
2 &: 3 Edw. 6, c. 24 (1548) (murder, where prosecuted).
2 Geo. 2, c. 21 (1728-1729) (murder, where prosecuted).
Orleans Organic Act of 1804, ch. 38, § 11, 2 Stat. 286.
Act of March 3, 1805, ch. 31, § 9, 2 Stat. 332.
I MISSOURI TERRITORIAL LAws 105, 124 (1842).
Id. at 239-40. In a letter dated Dec. 17, 1807, Frederick Bates, Secretary and
sometimes acting governor of Louisiana Territory, stated: "The codes of Governors
Harrison &: Wilkinson were hastily digested and during the last summer, I cooperated
with the Judges in giving them a thorough revision; and in forming a system which
has almost entirely superced[ed] the old one." I THE LIFE AND PAPERS OF FREDERICK
BATES 246 (Marshall ed. 1926). After describing the situation of "the Spanish and
French inhabitants," he observed: "The summary decree of a military officer however
tyrannical or absurd is much better suited to their ideas of the fitness of things, than
the dilatory trial by jury and 'the glorious uncertainty of the Common Law.' " Id. at
242-43. While a judge of Michigan Territory, Bates referred to the common law as
124
125
120
121
128
120
130
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The congressional act of 1805 had provided jury trial for all
criminal prosecutions and for all civil cases of the value of 100
dollars. Developments after 1812 will be found under Missouri,
infra.
Michigan (1805-1836). The act creating Michigan Territory
out of Indiana (1805) 131 incorporated by reference the provisions
of the Northwest Ordinance (1787) conferring "common law
jurisdiction" and guaranteeing judicial proceedings "according
to the course of the common law." It was at first assumed that the
laws of the prior territory had not continued in force, but the
contrary was held by the Supreme Court in 1806.132 Among the
prior laws was the Northwest statute of 1795 (Virginia Ordinance
of 1776) making the English law of 1607 the "rule of decision."
Though the provision of the Northwest Ordinance which saved
to certain "French and Canadian" inhabitants "their laws and
customs" relative to descent and conveyance of property did not
in terms apply to the French inhabitants of the Detroit area, Jay's
Treaty (1794; 1796) had provided that all settlers and traders in
the area should "continue to enjoy, unmolested, all their property
of every kind." Determination of these rights required reference
to the law in force prior to surrender by the British (1796),1 33
viz., the law declared in force by the Quebec Act of 1774.134
In 1808 Judge Woodward proposed re-enactment of all prior
laws deemed suitable, after which all prior laws not re-enacted
"ought to cease to have operation."135 This proposal led to a reenactment in 1809136 which was declared invalid by the Supreme
an "admired system •.. the wisdom of which is attested by the consequentive approbation of the ages." Id. at 85-86. In April 1808 he ordered from Baltimore the following:
"Dallas Reports-Washington's Reports-Burrow's Reports-Gilberts Law of Evidence
-Impey's Practice. Lilly's Entries. Boccaria on crimes &: punishments." Id. at 336. In
Michigan he participated in the adoption of the laws which constituted Michigan's
first code, usually referred to as the "Woodward Code" of 1806. In his opinion, these
laws plus the common law constituted "a code sufficiently ample for governments so
temporary and fleeting as those established by the Ordinance of 1787." Id. at 86.
131 Act of 1805 to Divide Indiana Territory, ch. 5, § 2, 2 Stat. 309.
132 See United States v. Muir (1806), reported in 1 TRANSACTIONS OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 1805-1814, at 58 (Blume ed. 1935). See also id.
at xxxvi-xxxvii.
133 Opinion by Woodward, C.J., recorded in the court's journal, printed in l
TRANSACTIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 1805-1814, at
385-95 (Blume ed. 1935).
134 See text accompanying note 71 supra.
135 12 MICHIGAN PIONEER COLLECTIONS 465 (1907).
130 Forty-four laws known as the "'Witherell Code." 4 LAWS OF THE TERRITORY OF
MICHIGAN 21-91 (reprint 1884).
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Court, and repealed in 1810.137 The legislature then adopted from
Virginia a law declaring:
"That no act of the parliament of England, and no act
of the parliament of Great Britain, shall have any force
within the territory of Michigan . . . .
"That the Coutume de Paris, or ancient French common
law, existing in this country, the laws, acts, ordinances, arrests and decrees of the governors or other authorities of the
province of Canada, and the province of Louisiana, under the
ancient French crown, and of the governors, parliaments or
other authorities of the province of Canada generally, and of
the province of Upper Canada particularly, under the British
Crown, are hereby formally annulled, and the same shall be
of no force within the territory of Michigan . . . .
"That the laws adopted and made by the governor and
judges of the territory of the United States north-west of the
river Ohio, and the laws made by the general assembly of the
said territory, and the laws adopted and made by the governor
and judges of the territory of Indiana, shall be of no force
within the territory of Michigan. . . ." 138
In Virginia the Ordinance of 1776 making English law of 1607
the rule of decision was not repealed until the revisals initiated
by Jefferson were completed in 1792. In Michigan the statute
based on the Virginia Ordinance was repealed before the proposed revision was completed-in fact, before it was fairly begun.
When the revision was completed in 1821 (Code of 1820), the
repealing act of 1810 was republished.
In 1818 the territorial supreme court refused to apply a British statute passed in 1677,130 holding that it must be guided by
the ancient common law, Judge Woodward stating:
"That system of regulations and enactments, which bears
the grand, and widely circulated, appellation of 'THE COMMON LAw,' receives its date from the third day of September,
in the year 1189.
"On that day, being the epoch of the coronation of
RICHARD Coeur de Lion; and the first monarch of the name
of RICHARD on the English throne; the 'COMMON LAw' became complete, and insusceptible of any additions.
Id. at 92.
I u..ws OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 900 (reprint 1871).
1311 29 Car. 2, c. 7 (1677) (prohibiting execution of civil process on Sunday).
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"The Common Law is composed of the unwritten, and
of the written, law of England, anterior to that rera." 140
In 1828141 the court refused to apply an English statute passed
in 1330,142 Woodbridge, C.J., noting:
"The whole body of the Com law-so far as it consists
with our peculiar Govt & with our own Stat. Law & and with
the altered condition of society, I have always considered as
in full force here. . . .
"But by the revolution, the Com. Law was lopped off....
"The Stat. of 4th Ed. 3 [1330] is introductive of new law
& does not I apprehend possess any force here." 143
In a well-written dissenting opinion Sibley, J., stated:
"The rigid principles of the Common law, have been
gradually relaxing and becoming obsolete in England as
the condition of the society has changed-The decisions
of the Courts in that Country, have done much in aid of
Legislation to bring about such a change in the Common
Law, as to render it almost a new Code of Laws when compared with, what it was in practice, under the Saxon and
Norman dynasties. . . .
"A question arises, and which it is necessary to meet at
this time-which is-Is the Com Law of England in force
in the Territory of Michigan? If so at what point of time
was it adopted?-! think there can be no question or doubt
but that the common law, at least so much thereof as is
applicable to the state of our society, is in force, and that it
was given us by the ordinance of 1787. The date of that
ordinance, in my opinion is the point of time at which we
must enquire, what was the common law, and such as we find
it was on that day, it is in force in the Ter" unless altered
since by positive enactments or statute Laws of the Territory.''144
140

Grant v. Thomas, Earl of Selkirk (1818), reported in 1 TRANsAcrioNS OF THE
COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 1814-1824, at 431, 436 (Blume ed. 1938).
Cf. GooDENOW, op. cit. supra note 88, at 63: "We next enter the reign of Richard I.
who entered upon his royal career, A.D. 1189. Here we quit the 'vantage ground' of the
common law: as we have it here, so it is to be taken by all who receive it naked as a
law; for that part of the law of England which consists in general customs and usage-as to estates, jurisdiction of courts, prerogatives of the king and parliament, all civil
powers, crimes and punishments, here ceases to increase its stock or extend its field
of operation."
141 Chene v. Campau (1828), reported in 1 TRANSAGrlONS OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 1825-1836, at 305 (Blume ed. 1940).
142 4 Edw. 3, c. 7 (1330) (executor's action for trespass).
143 Chene v. Campau, supra note 141, at 308·09.
144 Id. at 310-11.
SUPREME
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Sibley was willing to assume that the common law guaranteed
by the Northwest Ordinance was the common law of I 776, but
was unwilling to concur in the view that it was common law unaffected by English statutes. Rather, it was common law "in a
modified and improved state" that was in force. In 1886, after
pointing out that the repealing act of 1810 left "no statute or
code law in force except that of Michigan and of the United
States," Campbell, C.J., of the state supreme court observed:
"Michigan was never a common-law colony, and while we have
recognized the common law as adopted into our jurisprudence,
it is the English common law, unaffected by statute."145
Illinois (1809-1818). The act146 which created Illinois Territory out of Indiana (1809) incorporated by reference the "common law" provisions of the Northwest Ordinance, but did not
continue in force the statutes of the prior territory. In 1812147
the territorial legislature declared in force all unrepealed Indiana
statutes of general nature in force in 1809. Included was the Indiana statute of 1807 which had made, with specified exceptions, 148
the English law of 1607 the rule of decision. Referring to this
statute as re-enacted and modified after Illinois became a state,
the supreme court observed in 1852: "Our statute adopts not
only the common law of England, but all statutes in aid thereof,
passed prior to 4 James I, (except ... ) which are of a general
nature and not local to that kingdom." 149
Missouri (1812-1821 ). Louisiana (north of Orleans) became
Missouri Territory in 1812.150 The organic act provided that the
people of the territory should always be entitled to judicial proceedings "according to the common law and the laws and usages
in force in the said territory." In 1816 the territorial legislature
passed a statute, similar to the Virginia Ordinance of 1776,
making English law of 1607 the rule of decision, but with this
proviso:
"[T]hat none of the British statutes respecting crimes and
punishments shall be in force in this territory, nor shall any
U5 In the Matter of Lamphere, 61 Mich. 105, 108, 27 N.W. 882, 883 (1886).
U6 Act of 1809 to Divide Indiana Territory, ch. 13, § 2, 2 Stat. 515.
147

PoPE's

DIGEST

34 (Philbrick ed. 1938).

us See text accompanying note 112 supra. The statutory exceptions were the same
as those listed in note 104 supra.
149 Plumleigh v. Cook, 13 Ill. 669, 671 (1852). The court stated: "But the statutes
of Westminster 2, ch. 11, 13 Edward 1, and l Richard 2 c. 12, gave an additional remedy
[for an escape] by action of debt. And those statutes, being in aid of the common law,
are in full force in this State." Id. at 671.
150 Missouri Organic Act of 1812, ch. 95, § 14, 2 Stat. 747.
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person be punished by common law, where the laws and
statutes of this territory have made provision on the subject,
but where_the laws and statutes of the United States and this
territory have not made provision for the punishment of
offences, the several courts may proceed to punish for such
offences...." 151
This statute was one of the laws continued in force by the Missouri state constitution of 1820,152 and, as later modified, is still
in force. The legislative acts of Missouri, including the act of
1816, were adopted in Florida in 1822.153 A full discussion of the
Spanish law in force prior to 1807 is contained in Cutler v. Waddingham, 22 Mo. 206 (1855). In 1883 the state supreme court
held that the English statute of 1330,154 held inapplicable to
Michigan in 1828,155 was in force in Missouri as a part of the common law. 156
Alabama (1817-1819). The act157 -creating Alabama Territory
out of Mississippi provided that all laws in force in the territory
should continue. Included was the Mississippi statute of 1807
which had declared that "all statutes of England and Great-Britain" not contained in the volume of statutes should cease to
have force in the territory.158 Also included was the Mississippi
act of 1802, amended in 1807, which had provided that "every
other felony, misdemeanor or offence whatsoever not provided
for by this act, shall be punished as heretofore by the common
law." 159 These laws were continued in force by the state constitution of 1819.160 In 1851 the state supreme court found it unnecessary to inquire whether a statute of 43 Elizabeth161 was in force,
saymg:
151 1 MISSOURI TERRITORIAL LAws 436 (1842).
152 Mo. CONST., § 2 of the Schedule (1820).
153 See statements by Judge Brackenridge, in text at notes 173 and 174 infra.
154 4 Edw. 3, c. 7 (1330) (executor's action for trespass).
1515 Chene v. Campau (1828), reported in 1 TRANSACTIONS OF THE SUPREME CoURT
OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 1825-1836, at 305 (Blume ed. 1940).
156 Baker's Adm'r v. Crandall, 78 Mo. 584 (1883). Also held in force was 31 Edw.
3, St. 1, c. 11 (1357) (administration on intestacy). In 1855 a judge of the supreme court
stated: "After the introduction of the common law, the Spanish law no longer had any
existence here. It has only been regarded in the interpretation of contracts which had
been made before its abrogation and on the adjustment of rights which had accrued
prior to the introduction of the common law, just as we would look at this day to the
laws of Spain, in interpreting a contract which had been made in that kingdom."
Reaume v. Chambers, 22 Mo. 36, 53 (1855).
157 Alabama Organic Act of 1817, ch. 59, § 2, 3 Stat. 372.
158 STATUTES OF MISSISSIPPI TERRITORY 19 (Toulmin ed. 1807).
159 Id. at 324.
160 ALA. CoNST., § 5 of the Schedule (1819).
161 Statute of Charitable Uses, 1601, 43 Eliz. 1, c. 4.
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"It appears that that statute was passed in the year 1601,
and the first settlement of Virginia, (that being the first settlement in any part of the United States,) was in 1607. And the
doctrine appears to be settled that English statutes passed before the emigration of our ancestors to America, and which
were applicable to our situation and not inconsistent with
our institutions and government, constitute a part of the
common law, and are in force (unless repealed) in all the
States of the Union." 162

Arllansas (1819-1836). When Arkansas Territory was created
out of Missouri in 1819,163 all laws in force on July 4 were continued in force. Referring to the Missouri act of 1816164 which,
following the Virginia Ordinance of 1776, had made English law
of 1607 the rule of decision, a judge of the state supreme court
observed in 1884:
"This statute remained to govern the subsequently formed
territory of Arkansas, and was aftenvards re-enacted as a
part of the laws of the State, with some change of phraseology
and grammatical arrangements." 165
The statute of 43 Elizabeth (1601),1 66 held to be in force in
Alabama without the aid of a statute similar to the Virginia
Ordinance of I 776,167 was declared in force in Arkansas in 1905
under the Missouri act of 1816 as re-enacted in Arkansas after
statehood.168
Florida (1822-1845). The organic act of 1822169 continued
the laws then in force, viz., the laws of Spain as modified by an
ordinance promulgated by General Jackson in 1821 providing
that judicial proceedings in criminal cases should be conducted
"according to the course of the common law." 170 In the Fall of
1822 the territorial legislature repealed the prior laws, declaring
that English law of 1607 "together with the system of equity rec162 Carter &: Wife v. Balfour's Adm'r, 19 Ala. 814, 829 (1851) (emphasis added);
cited with approval in Nelson v. McCrary, 60 Ala. 301 (1877), involving 13 Edw. I, c. 18
(1285) (alternative methods of execution).
163 Arkansas Organic Act of 1819, ch. 49, § IO, 3 Stat. 495.
164 I MISSOURI T.EIUU'roRIAL LAws 436 (1842). See text at note 151 supra.
165 Horsley v. Hilburn, 44 Ark. 458, 473 (1884).
166 Statute of Charitable Uses, 1601, 43 Eliz. I, c. 4.
167 See text accompanying note 162 supra.
168 Biscoe v. Thweatt, 74 Ark. 545, 86 S.W. 432 (1905).
169 Florida Organic Act of 1822, ch. 13, §§ 9, 13, 3 Stat. 657, 659.
170 ANNALS OF CONG., 17th Cong., 1st Sess. 2551-53 (1855). See also THOMAS, A HISTORY
OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN NEWLY ACQUIRED T.EIUU'rORY OF THE UNITED STATES 54-97
(1904).
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ognized and practiced in the U. States," should be the rule of
decision.171 This statute was word for word the Missouri statute
of 1816,172 with the quoted reference to equity added. In 1831
Judge Brackenridge stated:
"The first acts of the Legislative Council were passed in
the summer of 1822, one year after the acquisition of the
Territory. . . . Foreseeing, however, the difficulty under
which the Territory would labor for the want of a suitable
code of laws, I had procured a volume of the digested Legislative acts of Missouri, which had been similarly situated,
having been also a province of Spain. . . . Our first Council,
received this volume as their text book, and adopted the
greater part of it, with little or no alteration."173
The following is his explanation of why the laws of Missouri
instead of those of Louisiana were copied:
"The Territory of Orleans, now the State of Louisiana,
continued to be governed in civil matters by Spanish laws;
the greater part of its inhabitants, having been accustomed
to them, and estates being held subject to its rules. Missouri,
on the contrary, was settled by citizens of the United States,
habituated to English and American legislation. The volume
to which I have alluded, was the result of fifteen years experience in that State, and yet contained for the greater part,
little more than the adaptation of the joint labours of J efferson, Wythe and Madison, and of some of the Pennsylvania
Legislators, to the circumstances of the country."174
For some reason unknown to Judge Brackenridge all the 1822
statutes were repealed in 1823. At this time the legislature declared in force the common and statute law of England down to
July 4, 1776, except British statutes respecting crimes and misdemeanors.175 This act was revised in 1829,176 but retained the
cut-off date of July 4, I 776. "By the act adopting the Common
Law of England" it appeared to Judge Brackenridge "that none
of the British statutes, on the subject of crimes and misdemeanors"
were in force in the territory in 1831 except such as were "declar171

Acrs OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF THE TERRITORY OF FLORIDA 1822, at 53 (1823).
1 MISSOURI TERRITORIAL LA.ws 436 (1842). See text at note 151 supra.
173 Presentments of the Grand Jury of Jackson County, Dec. 1831, 24 TERRITORIAL
PAPERS 609, 613.
174 Ibid.
175 Acrs OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF THE TERRITORY OF FLORIDA lll (1823).
176 Id. at 8 (1829).
172

1963]

TERRITORIAL COURTS AND LAW

495

atory, and in aid of the Common Law." 177 In 1845 the governor
of the state of Florida was "authorized to appoint some suitable
person, to collect and arrange, under appropriate heads, all the
Statutes of Great Britain, in force in this state."178 This was intended to clear up the uncertainty which had existed throughout
the territorial period as to precisely what statutes of England were
in force. The appointment was made, and the list compiled but
not officially approved and not published until almost a century
later.110
Wisconsin (1836-1848). The act180 creating Wisconsin Territory out of Michigan (1836) incorporated by reference the provision of the Northwest Ordinance (1787) that guaranteed "judicial
proceedings according to the course of the common law." The
organic act further provided that "the existing laws of the Territory of Michigan" should be extended over Wisconsin until altered or repealed. 181 Among the laws extended was the Michigan
act of 1810182 declaring that no English or British statute should
have force within the territory. In 1839 the Wisconsin legislature repealed all Michigan acts in force in Wisconsin on July 4,
1836, at the same time providing that "none of the statutes of
Great Britain" should be considered as law of the territory. 183
The state constitution (1848) provided:
"Such parts of the common law as are now in force in
the territory of Wisconsin, not inconsistent with this constitution, shall be and continue part of the law of this state until
altered or suspended by the legislature."184
In 1864 the state supreme court found it reasonable to hold that
"when our territorial legislature and the framers of our constitution recognized the existence here of the common law,
they must be held to have had reference to that law as it existed, modified and amended by English statutes passed prior
to the revolution. As before shown, there was no one time
177 24 T.ERRITORIAL PAPERS 609, 615. See also Day, Extent to Which the English
Common Law and Statutes Are in Effect, 3 U. FLA. L. R.Ev. 303 (1950); Note, 3 U. FLA.
L. R.Ev. 74 (1950),
178 Ac::rs OF FLORIDA ll8 (1845).
179 3 FLA. STAT. 1941, at 3 (published in 1946 under

the heading HELPFUL
MATIER).
180 Wisconsin Organic Act of 1836, ch. 54, § 12, 5 Stat. 15.
181 Ibid.
182 1 LAws OF THE T.ERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 900 (reprint 1871).
183 STATUTES OF THE T.ERRITORY OF WISCONSIN 1838-1839, at 404, 407 (1839).
1s, WIS. CONST. art. 13, § 13 (1848).

AND USEFUL

496

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

applicable to all the colonies, and there is no reason to assume
that we should adopt the commencement of one colony rather
than another as the time applicable to us. The revolution
itself is the dividing line which the reasoning of these cases
would suggest for us." 185

In 1872186 the court found that an English statute enacted in
1707187 was in force in Wisconsin as a part of the common law,
but that a statute enacted in England in 1774188 was not in force.
The court had "every reason to think" that the act of 1707 had
been "looked upon as a part of the laws of the colonies before the
revolution," but that the statute of 1774 was enacted
"on the very eve of the revolution, and at a time when we
know our ancestors, in their colonial state, could not have
become familiar with, or have ratified or adopted it, and at
a time, too, when, as history shows, all or nearly all respect
for British sovereignty and British laws or acts of parliament
then being passed, was well nigh extinct throughout the
colonies. " 189
In 1956 this statement was made:
"The common law in effect at the time of the adoption of
our state constitution is difficult of definition. We do not
think it is confined to English statutes and the decisions of
English courts. . . . [T]he term 'common law' is broad
enough to embrace customs and usages and legal maxims
and principles in vogue at that time." 190
Iowa (1838-1846). The act191 creating Iowa out of Wisconsin
(1838) declared that the inhabitants of the new territory should
be entitled to all the rights, privileges, and immunities theretofore granted to Wisconsin, and that the "existing laws" of Wisconsin should be continued until modified or repealed. These
provisions extended to Iowa the article of the Northwest Ordinance (1787) guaranteeing "judicial proceedings according to the
course of the common law," and the Michigan statute of 1810192
declaring that no English or British statute should be in force. In
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192

Coburn v. Harvey, 18 Wis. 156, 162 (1864).
Spaulding v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 30 Wis. 110 (1872).
6 Anne, c. 31, § 6 (1706-1707) (loss by fire).
14 Geo. 3, c. 78, § 86 (1774) (loss by fire).
Spaulding v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 30 Wis. 110, 117-18 (1872).
Menne v. City of Fond du Lac, 273 Wis. 341, 345, 77 N.W.2d 703, 705 (1956).
Iowa Organic Act of 1838, ch. 96, § 12, 5 Stat. 239.
1 LAws OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 900 (reprint 1871).
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1840 the territorial legislature repealed all the laws of Michigan
and Wisconsin, and, like Wisconsin, declared that "none of the
statutes of Great Britain shall be considered as law of this territory."193 In a case before the state supreme court in 1857 it
was argued:
"The territory of Iowa was a part of the territory of
Louisiana. It had always, up to the time of its purchase by
the United States, been subject to the civil law, and the common law of England never was in force in any part of said
territory. The common law was not extended over this territory by the purchase, or by the treaty entered into in connection with the purchase. The common law has never been
in force in any part of the United States, except it was carried
there while subject to Great Britain, or was carried there and
established by positive statutory enactment." 194
In response Judge Woodward stated:
"In the first place, according to our recollection of history,
the common law was substituted for the civil by the Missouri
territory, of which this state was once a part. In the next
place, so many rights and titles-so great interests have grown
up, as if by and under the common law, and not by and under
the civil-that it would be the duty of a court to hold that
the people brought it with them. . . .
"But the ordinance of 1787, for the government of the
Northwest Territory, made it the law of that country; and
that was extended over Wisconsin, and then the laws of Wisconsin, over Iowa. And although the statutes of Michigan
and Wisconsin were repealed in 1840, the ordinance of 1787
was not affected, but remained in full vigor as before."195
The transaction involved in the case had occurred in October
1840 after enactment of the statute which declared that "none
of the statutes of Great Britain" should be considered law. Did
this statute preclude application of an English statute196 passed
in 1236? Judge Woodward's answer:
"Then the question is, whether the declaration of that
section extended to the statutes of England. Great Britain
is not the same with England, although it includes it. The
greater part, if not all those beneficial acts, which have been
193 LAws OF THE TERRITORY OF IowA 20 (1840).
194 O'Ferrall v. Simplot, 4 Iowa 381, 384 (1857) (argument for appellant).
195 Id. at 399-400.
198 Statute of Merton, 1235-1236, 20 Hen. 3, c. 1 (damages on writ of dower).
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adopted into the laws of the American States, were enacted
before the Union with Scotland. The periods at which the
English statutes have been held to cease operating upon
American law, have been different in different states.
"Some have stopped at the fourth of James I [1607],
which was about the period of the first emigration to this
country; some have fixed the epoch of our revolution; and
some, if we mistake not, that of the revolution of 1688. The
above act of 1840 may reasonably be considered as having
prescribed the event of the union of the crown of England
with that of Scotland, which was nearly contemporaneous
with that of the English revolution, it having taken place in
the year 1707. This is more reasonable than to regard that
declaration as to the statutes of Great Britain, as synonymous
with a like declaration in relation to the statutes of England,
which would receive support from neither history, language,
nor the principles of interpretation. We conclude, therefore,
that the statute of Merton is not deprived of any effect by
the foregoing declaration of the act of 1840."197
In 1902198 the court referred to an English statute passed in
169!199 as being "a part of the common law of this country," citing
the case quoted from above. 200
Oregon (1848-1859). The act201 organizing Oregon as a territory (1848) incorporated by reference the article of the Northwest
Ordinance (1787) which guaranteed "judicial proceedings according to the course of the common law." The act further provided
that "the existing laws now in force in the territory of Oregon,
under the authority of the provisional government established by
the people thereof" shall continue until modified or repealed.
The provisional government referred to was established by the
inhabitants of the area without prior authority from Congress.202
In 1841 a judge with probate powers was appointed, and a resolution adopted directing him to act "according to the laws of the
state of New York" until "a code of laws be adopted by this
community."203 It was later questioned by a person then present
O'Ferrall v. Simplot, 4 Iowa 381, 384 (1857).
McClure v. Dee, 115 Iowa 546, 549, 88 N.W. 1093, 1093-94 (1902).
3 W. &: M., c. 14 (1691) (fraudulent devises).
In Gardner v. Cole, 21 Iowa 205, 210 (1866), statutes of 13 Eliz. 1, c. 5 (1571)
and 27 Eliz. 1, c. 4 (1584-1585) relating to fraudulent conveyances, were held to be in
force as "part of the unwritten law."
201 Oregon Organic Act of 1848, ch. 177, § 14, 9 Stat. 329.
202 For details, see Beardsley, Code Making in Early Oregon, 27 PACIFIC NORTHWEST
Q. 1 (1936).
203 Warner, History of the Oregon Code, 1 ORE. L. REv. 129, 132 (1922),
197
198
199
200
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"whether there was a single copy of the laws of that state [New
York] in the country for ten years after the last resolution was
passed. I know there was none at the time [February 18, 1841],
and only a single copy of the laws of Iowa two years after." 204
In I 843 a legislative committee recommended that specified
laws passed at the first session of the Iowa legislature (1838-39)
be adopted as laws of Oregon,205 and that "the laws of Iowa territory shall be the law of this territory, in civil, military, and criminal cases; where not otherwise provided for, and where no statute
of Iowa territory applies, the principles of common law and equity
shall govern." 206
The House Journal for the August I 845 session shows that
"the bill adopting Iowa statutes, was read a third time, and
passed"; also, that "the bill to amend [specified] Iowa statutes ...
was read a third time, and passed." 207
The Constitution of the state, of Oregon (1859) provided: "All
laws in force in the territory of Oregon when this Constitution
takes effect, and consistent therewith, shall continue in force until
altered or repealed. " 208
In I 9 I 9 the state supreme court found it necessary to decide
whether an English statute passed in 1738209 was a part of Oregon
common law; after quoting the above constitutional provision,
Bean, J., stated:
"In applying the general rule to a state which, like ours,
had no political existence before the Revolution, it must in
harmony with reason be held that when our territorial legislature and the framers of our Constitution and our courts
recognized the existence here of the common law, they must
have had reference to that law as it existed, modified and
amended by the English statutes passed prior to the Revolution."210

Minnesota (1849-1858). The Minnesota organic act (1849) 211
provided that "the laws in force in the Territory of Wisconsin"
at the time of that territory's admission as a state (1848) should
continue in force. Included was the Wisconsin act of 1839 which
204
205
206
207
208
!!Oil

210
211

Id. at 132-33.
Id. at 135.
Ibid.
Oregon House Journal, Aug. Session (1845). See Warner, supra note 203, at 140.
OIU:. CONST. art. XVIII, § 7 (1859).
11 Geo. 2, c. 19, § 15 (1737-1738) (distress for rent).
Peery v. Fletcher, 93 Ore. 43, 53, 182 Pac. 143, 147 (1919).
Minnesota Organic Act of 1849, ch. 121, § 12, 9 Stat. 407.
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had declared that "none of the statutes of Great Britain" should
be considered law.212 In 1877, after the state constitution (1857)
had declared that "all laws now in force in the territory of Minnesota" should remain in force, 213 the state supreme court held:
"With reference to that statute 2 Wm. & Mary, c. 5, which
gave the right to sell a distress (in that respect changing the
common law,) we agree with the supreme court of Wisconsin
in Coburn v. Harvey, 18 Wis. 147. It is there held, upon
grounds to which we see no objection, that the common law
of a state which had no political existence before the revolution, is the common law as modified and amended by English
statutes passed prior to our revolution. . . . As the statute
of William & Mary was passed long before the revolution, it
was held to be part of the common law of distress in Wisconsin, and, for the same reason, it is to be held to be part
of the common law of Minnesota."214

New Mexico (1850-1912). When New Mexico was occupied
in the course of the Mexican War (1846) General Kearny undertook to establish a territorial government.215 His organic act, usually referred to as the "Kearny Code," began:
"'The government of the United States of America ordains and establishes the following organic law for the Territory of New Mexico, which has become a Territory of the
said government.' Then followed a transcript of the Organic
Law provided by Congress for the Missouri Territory. After
this came forty pages of laws for the government of the territory. These were compiled by Colonel A. W. Doniphan and
a private, Mr. W. P. Hall, who received notice of his election
to Congress from Missouri while engaged on the work. The
compilation was made from the laws of Mexico, modified to
conform to the Constitution of the United States, and from
the laws of Missouri, Texas, and Coahuila, the statutes of
Missouri, and the rest from the Livingston Code [of Louisiana] ."216
After a territorial government had been established by Congress
(1850) 217 the territorial legislature in 1851 provided that all laws
212 See note 183 supra.
213 MINN. CONST. art. 16, § 2 of the Schedule (1857).
214 Dutcher v. Culver, 24 Minn. 584, 591 (1877).
215 For details, see THOMAS, op. cit. supra note 170, at 101-58.
216 Id. at 105. Text of the "Kearny Code" in English and Spanish

NEW MEXICO LAWS OF 1851 (1852).
217 New Mexico Organic Act of 1850, ch. 49, 9 Stat. 446.
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previously in force in the territory should continue "excepting
in Kearny's Code the law concerning registers of land."218 At
the same time the legislature provided that "in criminal cases,
the common law as recognised in the United States and the several
States of the Union" should be the rule of practice and decision. 219
In 1876 it was provided that in all courts of the Territory "the
common law as recognized in the United States of America" should
be the rule of practice and decision. 220 The organic act (1850)
had provided that the supreme and district courts should "possess
chancery as well as common law jurisdiction."
"Did this section of the organic act bring into this territory the common law in the broadest sense, or did it simply
establish a system of procedure according to the course of the
common law? ... Strange as it may appear, this question has
never been decided by this court."221
Referring to the statute of 1876 the court, speaking in 1886, said:
"This territory ... was not a part of the original colonies,
but was acquired in 1848. The legislature has not in terms
adopted any British statutes, nor has it undertaken to define
what is embraced in the words 'common law,' used in [1876].
"We are, therefore, of opinion that the legislature intended by the language used in that section to adopt the
common law, or lex non scripta, and such British statutes
of a general nature not local to that kingdom, nor in conflict
with the constitution or laws of the United States, nor of this
territory, which are applicable to our condition and circumstances, and which were in force at the time of our separation from the mother country. The statute of limitations
(21 Jae.I.) falls within this category, and became the law of
limitations here in 1876, abrogating the Mexican law of
prescription. " 222
Quoting some of the above language in 1887223 the court held
that an English statute passed in I 710 224 was part of New Mexico's
common law.
NEW MEXICO LAws OF 1851, at 176 (1852).
Id. at 144. For meaning of "recognized," see Ex parte DeVore, 18 N.M. 246, 136
Pac. 47 (1913).
220 NEW MEXICO GENERAL LAws 122 (Prince ed. 1880).
221 Brinker, J., in Browning v. Estate of Browning, 3 N.M. (3 Gild., E.W.S. ed.) 659,
666, 9 Pac. 677, 679 (1886).
222 Id. at 674-75, 9 Pac. at 684.
223 Territory v. Ashenfelter, 4 N.M. (4 Gild., E.W.S. ed.) 93, 12 Pac. 879 (1887).
224 9 Anne, c. 20 (1710) (quo warranto) (c. 25, Stat. Realm).
218
210
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Utah (1850-1896). The Utah organic act (1850) provided that
the supreme and district courts should "possess chancery as well
as common law jurisdiction."225 In 1851 the first legislature of
the territory
"Resolved . . . That the laws heretofore passed by the
provisional government of the state of Deseret ... are hereby
declared to be legal, and in full force and virtue, and shall
so remain until superseded by the action of the Legislative
Assembly of the Territory of Utah." 226

By these laws the supreme court judges were given appellate jurisdiction "in all cases of Law and Equity," 227 but were not told
what law should govern them in deciding cases. In 1873 the territorial supreme court held that "common law" was in force, 228
but found it unnecessary to decide whether the English statute
of frauds 229 was in force as part of the common law. E,:nerson, J.,
stated:
"Utah was embraced in that acquisition [from Mexico].
As in Florida, the pre-existing law was Spanish. So in Utah,
it was Mexican, and in both cases the laws were derived
mainly from the laws of Rome. In neither did the English
Common Law, or the Statute of Frauds, prevail. Congress
made no special change, and the Territorial Legislature, upon
whom authority was conferred, have made no express enactment upon the subject.
"This Territory was first settled in 1847, and from that
time up to the acquisition and treaty in 1848, the settlers
were comparatively few in number. There were no settled
laws, usages and customs among them." 230
After noting that the many settlers who came in after the change
of sovereignty were from states and territories having different
laws and institutions, Judge Emerson continued:
"These diversities make it impossible to assume that any
specific body of the Common Law was transplanted to the
Territory by the fact of immigration.
225 Utah Organic Act of 1850, ch. 51, § 9, 9 Stat. 455.
226 Aces, REsoLUTIONS, AND MEMORIALS OF THE TERRITORY OF UTAH 1851, at 205
{1852).
221 An Ordinance To Provide for the Organization of the Judiciary of the State of
Deseret, passed Jan. 9, 1850, found in 8 UTAH HISTORICAL Q. 169 (1940).
228 First Nat'l Bank v. Kinner, 1 Utah 100 (1873).
229 Statute of Frauds, 1677, 29 Car. 2, c. 3.
230 First Nat'l Bank v. Kinner, 1 Utah 100, 106 (1873).
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"But one course was open, and that was for the whole
body of the people to agree, expressly or tacitly, upon a common measure. It was to be expected that the emigrants would
not be contented with the loose and alien institutions of an
outlying Mexican department, and they have not been.
"They have tacitly agreed upon maxims and principles
of the Common Law suited to their conditions and consistent
with the Constitution and Laws of the United States, and
they only wait recognition by the courts to become the Common Law of the Territory. When so recognized, they are
laws as certainly as if expressly adopted by the law-making
power."231
The chief justice reserved his opinion "upon the question how
far, or what parts of the Common Law of England should be
recognized in this Territory."232 In a case before the Supreme
Court of the United States in 1889, Mr. Justice Bradley stated:
"It is true, no formal declaration has been made by Congress or the territorial legislature as to what system of law
shall prevail there. But it is apparent from the language of
the organic act . . . that it was the intention of Congress that
the system of common law and equity which generally prevails in this country should be operative in the Territory of
Utah, except as it might be altered by legislation. . . . We
may, therefore, assume that the doctrine of charities is applicable to the Territory . . . ." 233
The following is from the syllabus of a state case decided in 1897:
"While the statute of uses234 never became a part of the
English common law, and has never been adopted by the legislature of this state, the rule of law that vests a passive or
naked trust in the person having the use is a part of the
common law of this state."235
In 1915, after the state legislature had declared (1898) that "the
common law of England" not repugnant to federal and state laws
should be "the rule of decision," 236 the Supreme Court reviewed
the above decisions, concluding:
231

Id. at 107.

J.,

232 Ibid. (McKean, C.
concurring in judgment of the court).
233 Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. I, 62 (1889).
234 Statute of Uses, 1535-1536, 27 Hen. 8, c. IO.
2311 Henderson v. Adams, 15 Utah 30, 48 Pac. 398 (1897).
236 UTAH REv. STAT. § 2488 (1898),
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"[W]hile Congress, by extending over the Territory of Utah
the Constitution and laws of the United States, put in force,
in the language of the Supreme Court of the United States,
'the system of common law and equity which generally prevails in this country,' yet did not so extend or transplant the
common law of England, with all its rigor and harshness, but
only so much of it as was and had been generally recognized
and enforced in this country, and as is and was suitable to
our conditions." 237

Washington (1853-1889). The act creating Washington Territory out of Oregon (1853) 238 provided that the territorial judges
should "possess chancery as well as common-law jurisdiction";
also, that existing laws should continue in force until amended
or repealed.239 In 1856 the territorial legislature declared that
"the common law, in all civil cases, except where otherwise provided by law, shall be in force." 240 In 1863 "the common law of
England" was made "the rule of decision."241 This statute was
re-enacted in 1877, adding "so far as the same is applicable to
the situation and circumstances of this Territory." 242 A similar
statute was enacted after Washington became a state.243 In 1892
the state supreme court stated that it understood that English
statutes of frauds were in force "by virtue of §1 of the Code."2H
In 194!245 it was assumed that the "common law" of Washington
included specified statutes of 4 Edward 3, 31 Edward 3, and
3 & 4 William 4.246 Following a quote of the state statute, the
court said in 1930:
"Construing this statute, we have held that the term
'common law,' as therein used, includes not only the unwritten law of England as it was administered by its courts,
Hatch v. Hatch, 46 Utah 116, 127, 148 Pac. 1096, 1100 (1915).
Washington Organic Act of 1853, ch. 90, § 9, 10 Stat. 175.
For discussions of the "existing laws" in Oregon, see Beardsley, supra note 202.
See alo Beardsley, Compiling the Territorial Codes of Washington, 28 PACIFIC NORTIIWEST
Q. 3 (1937); Beardsley, The Codes and Code Makers of Washington, 1889-1937, 80
PACIFIC N0RTIIWEST Q. 3 (1939); Warner, supra note 203.
240 Acrs OF THE LEGISLATIVE AssEMBLY OF THE TERRITORY OF WASHINGTON 1 (1856).
241 2 LAws OF WASHINGTON 3 (reprint 1896).
242 3 id. at 677.
2¼3 THE REvISED STATUTES AND CODES OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON § 4099 (1896).
244 Wagner v. Law, 3 Wash. 500, 502, 28 Pac. 1109, 1110 (1892). The statutes referred
to were, it seems, 13 Eliz. 1, c. 5 (1571) (fraudulent conveyances), and Statute of Frauds,
1677, 29 Car. 2, c. 3. See also Allen v. Kane, 79 Wash. 248, 140 Pac. 534 (1914).
245 Boyd v. Sibold, 7 Wash. 2d 279, 109 P.2d 535 (1941).
246 4 Edw. 3, c. 7 (1330) (executor's action for trespass); 31 Edw. 3, St. 1, c. 1 (1357)
(administration on intestacy); 3 8: 4 Will. 4, c. 42, § 2 (1833) (civil procedure).
237

238
239
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but also the general statutes of that commonwealth modifying
and interpreting the unwritten laws which were enacted prior
to and in force at the time of our Declaration of Independence."247
Kansas (1854-1861). The Kansas organic act (1854) 248 conferred on the territorial judges "chancery as well as common law
jurisdiction." In a message to the first territorial legislature Governor Reeder stated:
"It appears that the laws of the United States not inapplicable to our locality-the laws of the territory of Indiana
made between the 26th of March, 1804, and the 3d of March,
1805, enacted for the district of Louisiana-the laws of the
territory of Louisiana-the laws of the territory of Missourithe common law, and the law of the province of Louisiana at
the time of the cession, except so far as the latter have superseded the former, still remain in force in the territory of
Kansas. As the common law to a considerable extent was
adopted for the territory by congress as late as 1812, and by
the Missouri legislature as late as 1816 . . . it has without
doubt superseded and supplied [supplanted] a great amount
of the law previously existing."249
At the same session (1855) the legislature passed a statute, similar
to the Virginia Ordinance of I 776, making English law of 1607
"the rule of action and decision," except British statutes for the
punishment of crimes and misdemeanors.250 This statute was reenacted by the territorial legislature in 1859,251 and by the state
legislature in 1862.252 In 1868 the state legislature provided that
"the common law as modified by constitutional and statutory law,
judicial decisions, and the conditions and wants of the people"
should remain in force. 253 In 1872 Valentine, J., stated:
"We get our common law from England. It was brought
over by our ancestors at the earliest settlement of this country. It dates back to the fourth year of the reign of James I.,
or 1607, when the first English settlement was founded in this
country at Jamestown, Virginia. The body of the laws of
247
248
249

Garrett v. Byerly, 155 Wash. 351, 354, 284 Pac. 343, 344 (1930).
Nebraska-Kansas Act of 1854, ch. 59, § 9, 10 Stat. 280.
Quoted by Burch, J., in Clark v. Allaman, 71 Kan. 206, 220-21, 80 Pac. 571, 576

(1905).

250
2~1
252

Id. at 221, 80 Pac. at 577.
GENERAL LAws OF THE STATE
Ibid.

2:i3 GENERAL STATUTES OF KANSAS

OF KANSAS

678 (1862).

1127 (1868).
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England as they then existed now constitute our common law.
It is so fixed by statute in this state."254
According to the syllabus of a case decided in 1865: "The statute
of Wm. III, c.15,255 in aid of the common law, has not been
adopted in this state." 256
Nebraska (1854-1867). The Nebraska organic act (1854) 257
conferred on the territorial judges "chancery as well as common
law jurisdiction." In 1855 the territorial legislature provided
that "so much of the common law of England as is applicable"
should be law within the territory. 258 This statute was re-enacted
by the state legislature, and has continued in force. 200 In 1903
Roscoe Pound, C., asked:
"What is the meaning of the term 'common law of England,' as used in chapter 15a, Compiled Statutes? Does it
mean the common law as it stood at the time of the Declaration
of Independence, or as it stood when our statute was enacted,
or are we to understand the common-law system, in its entirety, including all judicial improvements and modifications
in this country and in England, to the present time, so far
as applicable to our conditions? ... The term 'common law
of England,' as used in the statute, refers to that general system of law which prevails in England, and in most of the
United States by derivation from England, as distinguished
from the Roman or Civil Law system, which was in force in
this territory prior to the Louisiana purchase. Hence the
statute does not require adherence to the decisions of the
English common-law courts prior to the Revolution, in case
this court considers subsequent decisions, either in England
or America, better expositions of the general principles of
that system."260
In another opinion delivered in 1903261 the learned Commissioner pointed out that "in the whole course of decision in Nebraska, from the territorial courts to the present," only three
established common-law doctrines had been declared inapplica254 See Kansas Pac. Ry. v. Nichols, 9 Kan. 162, 173 (1872); citing statutes referred
to in notes 251 and 253 supra.
255 9 Will. 3, c. 15 (1697-1698) (arbitration).
256 Stigers v. Stigers, 5 Kan. 397 (1865).
257 Nebraska-Kansas Act of 1854, ch. 59, § 9, 10 Stat. 280.
258 NEBRASKA LAws 328 (1955).
259 NEB. REv. STAT. § 49-101 (1943).
260 Williams v. Miles, 68 Neb. 463, 470-71, 94 N.W. 705, 708 (1903).
261 Meng v. Coffee, 67 Neb. 500, 507, 93 N.W. 713, 715 (1903).
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ble.262 Recent rejections of the English statute of uses263 and the
statute of Elizabeth I concerning charitable264 uses were because of
conflicts with local legislation.265
Colorado (1861-1876). The Colorado organic act (1861) 266
conferred on the territorial judges "chancery as well as common
law jurisdiction." In 1861 the territorial legislature passed a statute,267 similar to the Virginia Ordinance of 1776, making English
law of 1607 the rule of decision, except specified parts of statutes
of Elizabeth I and Henry 8.268 This statute was re-enacted by
the state legislature, and has continued in force. 269 In 1888 a
statute of George 2210 was declared inapplicable to Colorado,
Stallcup, C., stating:
"The common law of England had never obtained in this
portion of the North American continent previous to its acquisition by our general government. This portion of our
country was never under British dominion. The acquisition
thereof was by treaty and purchase long after the Revolution,
and from powers not having the common law, but the civil
law; so that the first foot-hold or actual existence of the common law of England here was necessarily by legislative enactments, and necessarily limited according to the expression of
such enactments. . . . Our legislature having adopted the
common law of England as it existed prior to the fourth year
of the reign of James I., our courts cannot substitute a different date." 271
In 1885 the court had refused to apply a statute of 5 & 6 Edward
6,272 holding that it was "irreconcilably inconsistent" with a Colorado statute.273
262 Ibid. "(I) [W]ith reference to trespass upon wild lands by cattle ••• ; (2) with
reference to the effect of covenants to pay rent in a lease after destruction of leased
buildings ••• ; and (3) with reference to estates by entirety ••••"
263 27 Hen. 8, c. 10 (1535-1536) (statute of uses).
264 43 Eliz. I, c. 4 (1601) (charitable gifts).
26l'i Meng v. Coffee, 67 Neb. 500, 93 N.W. 713 (1903) (Roscoe Pound, Commissioner).
266 Colorado Organic Act of 1861, ch. 59, § 9, 12 Stat. 174.
267 COLORADO TERRITORIAL LAws 35 (1861).
268 37 Hen. 8, c. 9 (1545) (usury); 13 Eliz., c. 8 (1571) (usury); 43 Eliz. I, c. 6, § 2
(1601) (frivolous suits). Same as "repealed" in Northwest, see note 104 supra.
269 COLO. R.Ev. STAT. A.-;N. § 135-1-1 (1953). See also COLO. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 153-1-1
(Supp. 1960), for recent court application of this statute.
270 Probably 11 Geo. 2, c. 19 (1737-1738) (distress for rent).
271 Herr v. Johnson, 11 Colo. 393, 396, 18 Pac. 342, 343 (1888).
272 5 &: 6 Edw. 6, c. 16 (1551-1552) (sale of offices).
273 People ex rel. Goddard, 8 Colo. 432, 434, 7 Pac. 301, 303 (1885). In 1903, the
court of appeals held the Statute of Uses, 1535-1536, 27 Hen. 8, c. 10, had been "adopted"
by Colorado statute, Teller v. Hill, 18 Colo. App. 509, 72 Pac. 811 (1903).
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Nevada (1861-1864). The Nevada organic act (1861) 274 conferred on the territorial judges "chancery as well as common-law
jurisdiction." A territorial statute passed in 1861275 declared that
"the Common Law of England" should be the rule of decision.
This statute, continued in force by the state constitution, was
re-enacted by the state legislature.276 In 1865 Lewis, C.J., pointed
out that the common law adopted "in this Country" was the common law of England "as amended or altered by British statutes
in force at the time of the emigration of our colonial ancestors." 277
Brosnan, J., on petition for rehearing, asked: "When the common
law of England, consisting in part of statutes, as we have shown,
has been adopted in the United States, why may not Americans,
like the adventurous emigrants of other nationalities, carry with
them the common law of their country into the Territories acquired since the Revolution?" 278 In 1874 the Court held that an
English statute "in force in England at the time of the declaration
of American Independence, and being applicable to our situation,
constitutes a part of the common law of the United States." 279 A
statute of 9 Anne280 was held to be in force in 1876281 and 1909.282
Dakota (1861-1889). The Dakota organic act (1861) 283 conferred on the territorial judges "chancery as well as common-law
jurisdiction." At its first session the territorial legislature adopted
codes of criminal and civil procedure. The "Field" Civil Code
was adopted in 1865. Criminal procedure was to be "according
to the course of the common law," except when the Code pointed
out a different mode.284 To take care of a case not provided for
by the Code of Civil Procedure, "common law practice" could
be adopted "to prevent a failure of justice."285 The following
reasons for adopting the Field Civil Code have been given:
Nevada Organic Act of 1861, ch. 83, § 9, 12 Stat. 212.
LAws OF NEVADA TERRITORY I (1861).
NEV. R.Ev. STAT. § 1.030 (1957).
Hamilton v. Kneeland, I Nev. 40, 55 (1865). The statute involved was 32 Hen.
8, c. 34 (1540) (grantees of reversions).
278 Hamilton v. Kneeland, supra note 277, at 57.
279 Ex parte Blanchard, 9 Nev. 101, 105 (1874). The statute involved was 10 & 11
Will. 3, c. 17 [10 Will. 3, c. 23 (1697-1698) (suppression of lotteries)].
2so 9 Anne, c. 14 [19] (1710) (gaming).
281 Evans v. Cook, 11 Nev. 69 (1876).
282 Burke v. Buck, 31 Nev. 74, 99 Pac. 1078 (1909).
283 Territory of Dakota Act of 1861, ch. 86, § 9, 12 Stat. 241.
284 DAKOTA TERRITORIAL LAws § 187, at 205-06 (1862). As amended in 1875 [DAKOTA
TERRITORIAL LAws § 526, at 162 (1874)] the code directed that practice not specifically
provided for should be "in accordance with the procedure, practice and pleadings of
the common law, and assimilated as near as may be with the procedure, practice and
pleadings of the United States or federal side of said courts." Ibid.
285 DAKOTA TERRITORIAL LAws § 378, at 117 (1867).
274
275
276
277
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"In 1865, the very year of the submission of the Field
civil code, it was adopted by the legislature of Dakota Territory. The popularity of the code in a frontier community,
and its lack of popularity in the older states of the east, is
not surprising. A young state, without any local legal tradition, confronted with the problems of pioneer life, would
naturally welcome a legislative summary of the experience of
the eastern states in reconciling the rules of the English common law to American conditions. When the Field code was
published, American law had just completed the period during which judges and text-writers, such as Kent and Story,
had fixed the general principles of American private law.
The Field code was an epitome of this reaction of a community still largely imbued with the frontier spirit to a system of law which had developed in an older civilization under
different conditions. Since its drafting, it has been adopted,
with minor changes, in five Western states: in North and
South Dakota, in California in 1872, in Idaho in 1887, and
in Montana in 1895."286
In 1924 a judge of the North Dakota Supreme Court pointed out:
"Our legislature has distinctly recognized the common law as applicable in certain cases in the absence of statute."287
Arizona (1863-1912). The Arizona organic act (1863) 288 conferred on the territorial judges the same jurisdiction as had been
conferred on the judges of New Mexico, and provided that "all
legislative enactments of the Territory of New Mexico not inconsistent with the provisions of this act," should continue in
force until amended or repealed. In 1864 the territorial legislature provided that "the common law of England" should be "the
rule of decision." 289 In 1887 this was amended to read:
286 Harrison, The First Ralf-Century of the California Civil Code, IO CALIF. L. REv.
185, 187 (1922).
287 Bank of Conway v. Stary, 51 N.D. 399, 410, 200 N.W. 505, 509 (1924). In McKean,
British Statutes in American Jurisdictions, 78 U. PA. L. REv. 195 (1929), the author states:
"It is also doubtful whether there be any British acts of Parliament which would be
recognized as part of the law of North Dakota or South Dakota. A careful scrutiny of
the indexes of the North Dakota and South Dakota reports fails to bring to light any
satisfactorily definite ruling on acts of Parliament. This may be due to the haphazardness of litigation. The North Dakota case of Pratt v. Pratt [29 N.D. 531, 536, 151 N.W.
294, 295 (1915)] defines the common law as containing no statute of limitations, a
proposition which goes far towards establishing the principle that no British statutes
form part of the common law of North Dakota ••.." Id. at 207.
288 Arizona Organic Act of 1863, ch. 56, § 2, 12 Stat. 665.
289 THE HOWELL CODE § 7, at 440 (1865). This act further provided: "Sec. I. All
laws, customs, ordinances, and decrees of the Mexican Republic; all laws, customs,
ordinances, and decrees of the kingdom of Spain; and all legislative enactments of the
Tcnitory of New Mexico, now or heretofore in force in this Territory, are hereby
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"The common law of England so far only as it is consistent with and adapted to the natural and physical condition of this territory, and the necessities of the people thereof,
and not repugnant to, or inconsistent with the constitution
of the United States, or bill of rights, or laws of this territory,
or established customs of the people of this territory, is hereby
adopted and shall be the rule of decision in all the courts of
this territory." 290
Re-enacted by the state legislature, it is still in force. 291 In 1937
Lockwood, J ., of the state supreme court, after quoting from a
New Mexico case decided in 1886,292 stated:
"We agree that the rule laid down by the Supreme Court
of New Mexico is the one applicable to Arizona, and hold
that the 'common law' referred to by our legislature at various times means the unwritten or common law of England,
together with the acts of parliament of a general nature, and
not local to Great Britain, which had been passed and were
enforced at the time of our separation from the mother country so far, of course, as they are suitable to our wants, conditions, and circumstances.
"It is plain from this definition that the statute of limitations of 21 James 1293 falls within this category." 294
Idaho (1863-1890). The Idaho organic act (1863) 295 conferred
on the territorial judges "chancery as well as common-law jurisdiction." In 1864 the territorial legislature declared that "the common law of England" should be "the law of the land."200 At the
repealed ••• .'' Powell, Perpetuities in Arizona, 1 Aruz. L. REv. 225, 253 (1959), states:
"The first act of the legislative assembly empowered the Governor 'to appoint a commissioner to prepare and report a code of laws for the use and consideration of the
legislature.' Associate Justice William T. Howell, fresh from the Michigan borrowings
from New York, produced the 'Howell Code,' modelled on the laws of New York,
Michigan, and California.'' After pointing out (id. at 228) that "down to 1830," that
is, down to the adoption of the New York Revised Statutes of 1830, "no English
speaking jurisdiction had adopted a topically organized set of statutes," Powell traces
(id. at 230) the influence of the New York experience into Michigan, Wisconsin,
Minnesota, the Dakotas, and Arizona.
STAT. § 2935, at 523 (1887).
ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 1-201 (1956).
Browning v. Estate of Browning, 3 N.M. (3 Gild., E.W.S. ed.) 659, 9 Pac. 677
(1886). See text accompanying note 221 supra.
293 Statute of Limitations, 1623-1624, 21 James 1, c. 16. For application of Statute
of Westminster II, 1285, 13 Edw. 1, c. 34, see Pendleton v. Brown, 25 Ariz. 604, 613, 221
Pac. 213, 216-17 (1923).
294 Masury &: Son v. Bisbee Lumber Co., 49 Ariz. 443, 463, 68 P.2d 679, 688 (1937).
295 Idaho Organic Act of 1863, ch. 117, § 9, 12 Stat. 811.
296 LAWS OF THE TERRITORY OF IDAHO 527 (1864).
290 Aruz. REv.

291
292
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time the Field Civil Code was adopted (1887) (see Dakota supra)
the act was revised to read:
"The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to, or inconsistent with the Constitution or laws of the
United States, in all cases not provided for in these Revised
Statutes, is the rule of decision in all the Courts of this Territory."207
This statute was re-enacted by the state legislature and has continued in force. 298 In a discussion of "British Statutes in American Jurisdictions," McKean stated in 1929:
"No indexes seem to refer to any British statutes as being
in force in Idaho. This is not conclusive, for it is frequently
the case in other jurisdictions that useful rules of decision are
found in the reports, which are not covered by official syllabi,
and, as a matter of personal observation, many British statutes
have been found, in the course of preparing this article, which
are not indexed at all. The Idaho statute, which recognizes
as part of its legal system 'the common law of England,' is similar to those of California, and Nevada, which, as already
stated, construe the phrase 'common law of England' as including pertinent British statutes." 299

An explanation of the absence of cases dealing with British statutes may be found in the fact that the Field Civil Code incorporated all British statutes deemed desirable. In one of the California cases referred to by McKean the court, after citing the
section of the Code making "the common law of England" the rule
of decision, stated:
"It would be strange, indeed, if our legislature should
have designed to limit the applicability of the code section
to the ancient and frequently most barbarous rules and customs of the common law, and in so doing refuse to take into
account the mitigation of their harshness and the broadening
of the rules themselves which followed the successive enactments of the English statutes. To the contrary, we hold that
our legislature in its use of the phrase 'common law' had in
contemplation the whole body of that jurisprudence as it
stood, influenced by statute, at the time when the code section was adopted." 300
207 IDAHO R.Ev. STAT. §§ 18, 63 (1887)
208 IDAHO CODE §§ 73-116 (1949).
299 McKean, supra note 287, at 201.

(a general provision "applicable to all codes').

soo Martin v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. 289, 293, 168 Pac. 135, 136 (1917). Shaw,

J.,
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This case, according to McKean, "recognized the doctrine of the
statute of 11 Henry VIII, Chapter 12 (1519), enacted to help
and speed poor persons in their suits." 301
Montana (1864-1889). The Montana organic act (1864) 302 conferred on the territorial judges "chancery as well as common-law
jurisdiction." In 1865 the territorial legislature provided that
"the common law of England, so far as the same is applicable
and of a general nature" should be the rule of decision. 303 This
provision304 now reads the same as the Idaho statute of 1887
(supra). 305 After referring to the statute as revised, a justice of
the state supreme court stated in 1925:
"The common law of England means that body of jurisprudence as applied and modified by the courts of this
country up to the time it became a rule of decision in this
commonwealth; that time began with our first territorial
Legislature. " 306
When the Field Civil Code was adopted in 1895 the following
was enacted:
"In this state there is no common law in any case where
the law is declared by the code or the statute; but where
not so declared, if the same is applicable and of a general
nature, and not in conflict with the code or other statutes,
the common law shall be the law and rule of decision." 307
Absence of state cases dealing with British statutes308 may be explained, as in Dakota and Idaho, by the fact that the Field Civil
Code incorporated all British statutes deemed desirable. In this
connection it should be noted that many territorial legislatures
including Montana adopted codes of civil procedure based on the
Field Code of 1848.309 Hepburn states:
dissented at 299-300, 168 Pac. at 139, from the statement that the "common
England" includes the law "as it stood influenced by statute" when the code
was adopted in 1850. "In 1850 there were in England, I have no doubt, many
acts of parliament in force which no one would claim were adopted as parts
law by the act of our legislature."
301
(1495)
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309

law of
section
general
of our

McKean, supra note 287, at 198. The statute involved was 11 Hen. 7, c. 12
(suing in forma pauperis).
Montana Organic Act of 1864, ch. 95, § 9, 13 Stat. 88.
Acrs, REsOLUTIONS AND MEMORIALS OF THE TERRITORY OF MONTANA 356 (1866).
REV. CODES OF MONTANA § 12-103 (1955).
See note 297 supra.
Herrin v. Sutherland, 74 Mont. 587, 594, 241 Pac. 328, 330 (1925).
MONTANA CODES AND STATUTES, CIVIL CODE § 4651, at 754 (Sanders ed. 1895).
McKean, supra note 287, at 201, 207.
HEPBURN, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING 95-113 (1897).
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"Montana also has received its legislation very largely from
California. Early in 1865 the provisions of the California
practice act were substantially adopted by the :first legislature
of Montana in an act to regulate proceedings in civil cases.
There was a revision in 1879, when a code of civil procedure
framed on the lines of the California statute was adopted, as
part of a general body of laws. In 1895 the fourth regular
session of the state legislature revised and reenacted this code,
along with the other codes of Montana, but in all this the
lines of the California codes were carefully observed." 310

As codification progressed, reliance on British statutes tended to
disappear.
Wyoming (1868-1890). The Wyoming organic act (1868) 311
conferred on the territorial judges "chancery as well as common
law jurisdiction." The act further provided "that all general territorial laws of the Territory of Dakota in force in any portion
of said Territory of Wyoming," except specified mining laws,
should continue in force "throughout the said Territory until
repealed." In 1869 312 the territorial legislature enacted a statute,
similar to the Virginia Ordinance, making English law of 1607,
with the exception of three specified statutes,313 the rule of decision. In 1886 the legislature provided:
"If a case ever arise in which an action or proceeding for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the redress or prevention of a wrong, cannot be had under this title, the practice of the common law may be adopted, so far as it may
be necessary to prevent a failure of justice."314

At this time the code of civil procedure, adopted from Ohio in
1869, was revised to follow the Ohio procedure code "with even
more literal exactness than before." 315 The statute making English law of 1607 the rule of decision was re-enacted by the state
legislature, and has continued in force. 316 In applying this statute
the state supreme court has given force to a statute of 32 Henry
310

311

Id. at 108.
Wyoming Organic Act of 1868, ch. 235, § 9, 15 Stat. 181.

312 GENERAL LAWS, MEMORIALS AND REsoLUTIONS OF THE TERRITORY OF '\\TYOMlNG

291-92

(1870).
313 37 Hen. 8, c. 9 (1545) (usury); 13 Eliz. 1, c. 8 (1571) (usury); 43 Eliz. 1, c. 6, § 2
(1601) (frivolous suits). Same as "repealed" in Northwest, note 104 supra.
SH WYO. REv. STAT., CODE OF CIV. PROC. § 3153, at 686 (1887).
315 HEPBURN, op. cit. supra note 309, at 110.
316 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 8-17 (1957).
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8,317 but denied force to an English statute passed in 1677.318
In 1940 Blume, J., stated:
"That section provides in brief that the common law of
England of a general nature in force in 1607 is the law of
this state except as it has been modified by judicial decisions,
and except in so far as it is inconsistent with the law of this
state. . .. The common law is not exactly the common law
of 1607 .... Our statute (Sec. 26-101) does not state what
are the judicial decisions to which reference is made. However, it is, and has been, the constant practice of courts in
common law jurisdictions to freely cite cases from other common-law courts, and we take it that the legislature had in
mind the judicial decisions of all the various jurisdictions." 319
The qualification "as modified by judicial decisions" appears in
the original territorial statute.
Alaska (1884-1959). An act of Congress approved in 1884
declared that the "general laws of the State of Oregon" then in
force should be the law of Alaska. 320 In a criminal code for Alaska
adopted in 1899 Congress provided: "The common law of England as adopted and understood in the United States shall be in
force in said District, except as modified by this act." 321 In a civil
code adopted for Alaska in 1900 this provision appears:
"So much of the common law as is applicable and not
inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States or
with any law passed or to be passed by the Congress is adopted
and declared to be the law within the district of Alaska. " 322
This provision, amended in 1933 to require consistency with acts
of the territorial legislature,323 continued in force until the end
of the territorial government. 324 After quoting the above acts of
Congress a district judge stated in 1902:
"In Patterson v. Winn, 5 Pet. 241, 8 L.Ed.108, it is said,
'The term "common law" means both the common law of
England, as opposed to written or statute law, and the statutes
317 Investors Guar. Corp. v. Thomson, 31 Wyo. 264, 225 Pac. 590 (1924). The statute
involved was 32 Hen. 8, c. 34 (1540) (grantees of reversions).
318 Barber v. Smythe, 59 Wyo. 468, 143 P.2d 565 (1943). The statute involved was
the Statute of Frauds (1677), 29 Car. 2, c. 3.
319 Naab v. Smith, 55 Wyo. 181, 192-93, 97 P.2d 677, 681 (1940).
320 Act Providing Civil Government for Alaska, ch. 53, § 7, 23 Stat. 25 (1884).
321 Ar.AsKA CRIM. CODE, ch. 429, tit. I, § 218, 30 Stat. 1285 (1899).
322 ALAsKA CIVIL CODE, ch. 786, tit. III, § 367, 31 Stat. 552 (1900).
323 COMPILED LAws OF Ar.AsKA, CIVIL CODE § 3271, at 660 (1933).
324 ALASKA COMPILED LAWS § 2-1-2 (1949).
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passed before the immigration of the first settlers to America.'
This latter definition, furnished by the court of last resort
for Alaska, would seem to be the one that should control this
court in its application of the common law to the case at
bar. . . .
"If Mr. Andrews [author of AMERICAN LAW (1900)] is
right in his statement that where no particular time is mentioned, and the common law adopted in general terms includes not only the common law proper, but all statutes in
aid thereof prior to the Declaration of Independence, then
the statute of 29 Charles II is part and parcel of the common
law to be administered by the courts of Alaska.'' 325
In 1903 a district judge of another division stated:
"But the old common-law rule in England had been
changed prior to our independence by the statute of Geo. III,
c.18 .... At the date of our independence that statute was
in force. It seems to follow, logically, that the old commonlaw rule never became the rule in the United States, for the
statute of Geo. III, being in amendment of the common law
and applicable to our condition, became the rule instead.
However this may be . . . .'' 326
In neither case was it necessary for the judge to determine whether
the particular English statute was a part of Alaska's common law.
Under the acts of Congress the judges of Alaska were to look to
the decisions of all the states and territories to see what principles
and rules originally English had been found applicable to American conditions. These principles and rules, whether originated
by English decision or statute or both, were to serve as the source
of Alaska's common law.
Oklahoma (1890-1907). The Oklahoma organic act (1890) 327
conferred on the territorial judges "chancery as well as common
law jurisdiction." The act extended to the part of Indian Territory organized as Oklahoma specified statutes of Nebraska,328 and
to the remainder of Indian Territory specified statutes of Arkan325 Valentine v. Roberts, 1 Alaska 536, 541-42, 544 (1902). The statute referred to
was 29 Car. 2, c. 7 (1677) (service of process on Sunday). See also text accompanying
note 139 supra for the Michigan treatment of the same statute.
326 In re Burkell, 2 Alaska 108, 119 (1903). The statute referred to was 10 Geo. 3,
c. 18 (I 770) (dog stealing).
827 Oklahoma-Indian Territory Act of 1890, ch. 182, § 9, 26 Stat. 85.
828 The list included the Nebraska provision for "common law" (see notes 258 and
259 supra) but was to be in force only until the adjournment of the first session of the
Oklahoma legislature.
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sas. 329 In 1893 the Oklahoma legislature provided that "the common law, as modified by constitutional and statutory law, judicial
decisions and the condition and wants of the people" should remain in force. 330 This statute was re-enacted by the state legislature and is still in force. 331 In 1893 the territorial supreme court
found it necessary to decide whether English common law, including the Statute of Frauds (1677), was in force in Indian Territory
in 1889. Burford, J., stated:
"It is contended that prior to the settlement of Oklahoma,
and until the same was superseded by statutory laws, the code
Napoleon, or civil law prevailed.
"Whatever may have been the laws of the country now
known as Oklahoma, they ceased to operate in the region
originally comprising the Indian Territory when the Territory ceased to be a part of the Territory of Louisiana and
the laws of the Territory of Indiana and the Territory of
Missouri, which may have once prevailed in said region, became inoperative in and ceased to have any force or effect
in the Indian Territory when that Territory ceased to be a
part of said Territories. . . ." 332
If, the judge continued, it should be conceded that the congressional act of March 1, 1889, providing a court for Indian Territory, did not "put the common law in force" except so far as was
necessary to execute the powers of the court,

"then it necessarily follows, on principle, that when people
from all parts of the United States, on the 22d day of April,
1889, settled the country known as Oklahoma, built cities,
towns and villages, and began to carry on trade and commerce
in all its various branches, they brought into Oklahoma, with
them, the established principles and rules of the common
law as recognized and promulgated by the American courts,
and as it existed when imported into this country by our
early settlers, and unmodified, by American or English statutes."333
In 1908 a justice of the state supreme court cited this case to
329 The list included the Arkansas provision for "common and statute law of England"-the act inherited by Arkansas from Missouri making English common law and
statutes prior to 1607 the rule of decision. See Arkansas, in text at note 165 supra,
830 STATUTES OF OKLA. § 3874 (CODE OF Crv. PROC. § 2) (1893).
831 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2 (1960).
832 McKennon v. Winn, 1 Okla. 327, 333-34, 33 Pac. 582, 584 (1893). The statute
involved was the Statute of Frauds (1677), 29 Car. 2, c. 3,
333 McKennon v. Winn, supra note 332, at 334-35, 33 Pac. at 585.
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support a statement that "when the people in 1889 came from
the different states into Oklahoma, they brought with them the
rules of the common law as recognized and promulgated by the
American courts." 334 He then referred to the statute335 which had
provided that the common law, as modified by constitutional and
statutory law, judicial decisions, and the conditions and want of
the people, should remain in force.
Hawaii (1900-1959). The Hawaii organic act (1900) 336 provided that "the laws of Hawaii not inconsistent with the Constitution or laws of the United States" should continue in force.
In 1903 the territorial legislature amended section 5 of Chapter
LVII of the Laws of 1892, Kingdom of Hawaii, to read as follows:
"The common law of England, as ascertained by English
and American decisions is hereby declared to be the common
law of the Territory of Hawaii in all cases, except as otherwise expressly provided by the Constitution or laws of the
United States, or by the laws of the Territory of Hawaii, or
fixed by Hawaiian judicial precedent, or established by Hawaiian usage, provided, however that no person shall be subject to criminal proceedings except as provided by the written
laws of the United States or of the Territory of Hawaii." 337
This statute continued in force throughout the territorial period.338 In 1911 Perry, J., of the territorial supreme court, declared:
"The statutes of George IV. (1827) and of Victoria (1848
& 1849) were enacted too recently to be regarded, in any possible meaning of that term as used in R.L., §1, as a part of
the common law of England. Whether the early statutes of
Philip & Mary (1553, 1554 & 1555) should be so regarded ...
need not be determined." 339
In 1912 the court held that a statute of 13 Elizabeth 1 was "a part
of" the territorial common law,340 stating that "had the principle"
of the statute "not been previously recognized we would not hesi334 Hoppe Hardware Co. v. Bain, 21 Okla. 177, 182, 95 Pac. 765, 767 (1908).
335 OKLA. R.Ev. ANN. STAT. § 4200 (Wilson's ed. 1903).
336 Hawaiian Organic Act of 1900, ch. 339, § 6, 31 Stat. 142.
337 HAWAII R.Ev. LAws 83 (1905).
338 HAWAII R.Ev. LAws § 1-1 (1955).
839 In re Craig, 20 Hawaii 447, 450 (1911). The statutes referred to were 1

&: 2
Ph. &: M., c. 13, § 5 (1554-1555) (criminal law); 2 &: 3 Ph. &: M., c. 10 (1555) (criminal
law); 7 Geo. 4, c. 64, § 2 (1826) (criminal law); 11 &: 12 Viet., c. 42, § 20 (1847-1848)
(indictable offenses).
HO Dee v. Foster, 21 Hawaii 1, 3 (1912). The statute referred to was 13 Eliz. 1, c. 5
(1571) (fraudulent conveyances).
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tate to hold that it was incorporated into our law by the provision
of the Judiciary Act of 1892."
Unincorporated Territories. To give in any detail the sources
of law prescribed for the unincorporated territories (Philippines,
Puerto Rico, Guam, Samoa, Canal Zone, and Trust Territory in
the Pacific) would extend too far this already tedious recital. Each
has presented a different problem, and the various solutions are
intriguing. It would also be of value to include the District of
Columbia, and the Republic of Texas. The treatment of British
statutes in the District has been unique. 841 Developments in areas
previously governed by Spanish law (Philippines, Puerto Rico,
Canal Zone, and Texas) should be compared with those in Louisiana. The Virgin Islands should be examined for remains of the
law of Denmark. But, as stated at the beginning of this discussion,
the detailed treatment is limited to the territories which have become states. Indian Territory has been noticed briefly under
Oklahoma.
Summary and Comment. When Congress was in doubt whether
the English system of law or the Spanish system should furnish
the rule of decision (Orleans, Mo., Ark., Fla.), the courts were
given jurisdiction of "criminal" and "civil" cases, and the preestablished law was continued in force. When Congress intended
that the English system should furnish the rule of decision, provisions such as the following were enacted:
Superior judges to have a common law jurisdiction. N.W.,
So., Miss., Ind., La., Mich., Ill.
Inhabitants entitled to benefits of judicial proceedings according to course of common law. N.W., So., Miss., Ind.,
Orleans, Mich., Ill., Mo., Wis., Iowa, Oregon, Minn.
Superior judges to have chancery as well as common law jurisdiction. Ind., Mich., Ill., Mo., Wis., Iowa, Oregon,
Minn., N.M., Utah, Wash., Kan., Neb., Colo., Nev., Dak.,
Ariz., Idaho, Mont., Wyo., Okla.
Common law of England as adopted and understood in the
United States to be in force. Alaska.
See D.C. CODE ANN., Historical Introduction, ix-xiv (1961). According to Cox,
"Mr. Albert included in his [1894] compilation the old English statutes in force in
the Colonies, including Maryland, or supposed by him to be so, from Magna Charta
to the thirteenth of George III, in the year 1773 • . • . The old English statutes
and some of the old Maryland statutes abound in antiquated English and redundant
verbiage, which it was unnecessary to re-enact, and many provisions in them are now
inapplicable and obsolete by reason of changes in the practice of the courts and social
and political conditions but it was historically correct to print the entire statutes containing them." Id. at xiii. A list of British statutes included in the D.C. CODE ANN. (1961)
will be found in volume III, at 2089. For illustrations, see "Waste," §§ 45-1301 to 1303.

J.,

841
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So much of common law as is applicable adopted and declared
to be law. Alaska.
Confusion resulted from extending to Orleans the benefits of
judicial proceedings according to the course of the common law
while continuing in force the prior Spanish law.
The provision extending to Alaska the common law of England as adopted and understood in the United States was the only
one in which Congress indicated what "common law" was intended, and this was accompanied by a more general provision.
For Congress to have been specific it would have been necessary
to designate the common law of some particular jurisdiction as
of a particular time. Each territory was open to settlement by
persons from all existing states and territories, and it was early
recognized that the laws of no one state should be imposed. There
was early talk of colonial common law, but as observed by Professor Tucker in 1803, " ... neither the common law of England,
nor the statutes of that kingdom, were, at any period antecedent
to the revolution, the general and uniform law of the land in
the British colonies." 342
"Being perfectly independent of each other," the colonies
pursued independent courses "until, like the radii of a circle,
they arrived from the same common center to points diametrically
opposite, or receding from each other in proportion to the length
they were extended." 343 In the one instance where an attempt
was made to extend the law of a colony and original state to a
territory (South of the Ohio), want of information made it impossible to determine matters which depended "upon usage and
the decisions of the superior courts." 344 It was only after reports
of decisions were being regularly published in all American jurisdictions that Congress declared that in Alaska the common law
of England "as adopted and understood in the United States"
should be in force.
Finding no one body of American common law, and no means
of knowing what each colony and original state had adopted for
itself, Congress could have gone to the center of Professor Tucker's
circle-to the common law of England. But to have done sowhatever date might have been selected-would have eliminated
all prior American experience. Settlers with different ideas of
1 TUCKER, BLACKSTONE 432 (1803).
Id. at 392.
SH Glasgow's Lessee v. Smith 8: Black.well, I Tenn. (Overton) 144, 153 (1805).

342
343
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what the common law was or should be would have had to adopt
their own common law.
Turning from acts of Congress to acts of the territorial legislatures we find a variety of provisions. Those illustrating attempts
to solve the problem of British statutes will be listed first:
Common law of England and statutes in aid of the common
law before 1607, the rule of decision.
Common and statute law of England down to 1776 in force.
Selected British statutes re-enacted; all others not in force.
No British statutes considered law.
Specified British statutes in force.
Specified British statutes not in force.
Ways of designating common law as a source of law without referring to British statutes are illustrated by the following:
Inhabitants entitled to benefits of judicial proceedings according to course of common law.
Specified courts to hear and determine according to course
of common law.
Chancery proceedings to be regulated by rules of English
chancery.
Criminal proceedings to conform to English common law.
Common law as recognized by or in the United States to be
the rule of practice and decision.
Common law in force.
Common law the rule of decision.
So much of the common law of England as applicable declared law.
Common law of England to be the rule of decision.
Common law of England as ascertained by English and American decisions to be the common law.
To see the problem faced by the territorial governments it
is necessary to have in mind: (1) There was no "general and uniform" common law of the original colonies as a group or of the
group of states formed from the colonies. (2) The adoptions of
common law in the individual colonies and original states were
buried in materials not available in the territories. (3) Settlers in
a territory from a particular state might have knowledge of the
common law of that state, but had no way of imposing it on
settlers from other states. (4) The English common law as administered in the king's courts was a single body of law available
in print. The Virginia Ordinance of 1776 had declared
"That the common law of England, all statutes or acts of

1963]

TERRITORIAL COURTS AND LAW

521

Parliament made in aid of the common law prior to the
fourth year of the reign of King James the first, and which
are of a general nature, not local to that kingdom, together
with the several acts of the General Assembly of this colony
now in force, so far as the same may consist with the several
ordinances, declarations, and resolutions of the General Convention, shall be the rule of decision, and shall be considered
as in full force, until the same shall be altered by the legislative power of this colony." 345
It is not surprising that many of the territorial governments found
in the Virginia act a solution of their problem.
Territorial statutes based on the Virginia Ordinance of 1776
were in force for varying periods of time in Northwest, Indiana,
Michigan, Illinois, Missouri, Arkansas, Florida, Kansas, Colorado,
and Wyoming. While it was obvious that no British statute could
have the force of a statute in an American territory after the
change of sovereignty, the view that applicable British statutes
were made territorial statutes by legislative adoption was widely
held. In Northwest the territorial legislature in form "repealed" 346
specified parts of statutes of 37 Hen. 8 (1545), 13 Eliz. 1 (1571), and
43 Eliz. I (1601) after the act based on the Virginia Ordinance
was adopted. 347 In five of the later territories the provisions "repealed" by Northwest were expressly excepted from the operation
of the general statute. 348
In 1776 Thomas Jefferson left Congress to participate in a
program to revise the laws of Virginia. As a member of a legislative committee he undertook to draft bills that would modify
the common law and supplant English statutes enacted prior to
1607. Commenting on the report of this committee (1779) he
stated in his Memoirs in 1829:
"We had in this work, brought so much of the Common
law as it was thought necessary to alter, all British statutes
from Magna Charta to the present day, and all the laws of
Virginia, from the establishment of our legislature, in the
4th Jae.I. to the present time, which we thought should be
1 THE REVISED CODE OF THE LA.ws OF VIRGINIA 135 (1819).
See 1 CHASE 218, 238, 293; PEASE 353, 401. See also OHIO UNREPORTED JUDICIAL
DECISIONS PRIOR TO 1823, at 211 (Pollack ed. 1952).
347 The statutes "repealed" were 37 Hen. 8, c. 9 (1545) (usury); 13 Eliz. 1, c. 8 (1571)
(usury); 43 Eliz. 1, c. 6, § 2 (1601) (frivolous suits).
348 Cf. McKean, British Statutes in American Jurisdictions, 78 U. PA. L. REv. 195,
211 n.97 (1929).
345
346
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retained, within the compass of one hundred and twenty-six
bills, making a printed folio of ninety pages only." 349
The program of revision thus commenced was completed in 1792
by a statute which recited that the General Assembly had thought
it advisable "specially to enact" such acts of Parliament "as to
them appear worthy of adoption, and do not already make a part
of the public code of the laws of Virginia." 350 The statute provided:
"That so much of the above recited ordinance [of 1776]
as relates to any statute or act of parliament, shall be, and is
hereby repealed; and that no such statute or act of parliament shall have any force or authority within this Commonwealth."351
At about the same time programs of revisal and repeal were undertaken in New York (1786-1788); New Jersey (I 792-1799); Vermont (1797). Similar programs were undertaken in two of the
territories: Mississippi (1807) and Michigan (1810-1821).
The Virginia revisal was not a code, but a statutory revision
which included British as well as Virginia statutes, plus, according to Jefferson, "so much of the common law" as the committee
thought necessary to alter. The Virginia Revised Code of 1819
contains side-margin references to "the English statutes in pari
materia." A tabulation of these references is attached (appendix,
infra) to demonstrate the magnitude of the British statute problem.352
In 1848 New York adopted a true code limited to pleading,
joinder, and some other phases of civil procedure. Codes based
on this code were adopted in: Minnesota 1851; Oregon 1854;
Washington 1854; Nebraska 1855; Kansas 1859; Nevada 1861;
Dakota 1862; Idaho 1864; Arizona 1864; Montana 1865; Wyoming
1869; Oklahoma 1890.353
In general it may be said that as bodies of statutory law were
developed, reliance on British and other prior statutes tended to
disappear. The source of decisional law was prior decisional law.
349 1 MEMOIRS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 36 (1829).
350 1 THE REvISED CODE OF THE LAws OF VmGINIA 137 (1819).
351 Ibid.
352 Mrs. Brown, co-author of the present article, has recently completed

an

extensive
study of British Statutes in American Law 1776-1836. This study, to be published this
year by the University of Michigan Law School, does not include re-enacted British
statutes, but does show in full detail which British statutes were adopted or rejected
as "rules of decision" in the period covered.
353 HEPBURN, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING 95-113 (1897).
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The decisional law of the colonies being inaccessible, the courts
were forced to look to English decisions and such American decisions as had been reported. Reliance on English decisions prior
to Independence was considered proper, but more and more the
tendency was to look to American decisions, especially those in
which the adaptability of a rule originally English to American
conditions had been considered.
EXTENT OF LEGISLATIVE POWER

The first plan of government for the "western territory" (1784)
provided that settlers on any purchased territory might adopt "the
constitution and laws of any one of the original states." 354 This
plan was approved by the Congress of the Confederation but
never put into operation. A later proposal that Congress establish
in the area the laws of a state designated by Congress355 was not
approved, nor was a proposal that the territorial judges agree on
the criminal laws "of some one state." 356 The plan finally adopted
(Ordinance of 1787) 357 provided that the territorial governor and
judges adopt and publish "such laws of the original states, criminal and civil," as might be "necessary and best suited to the circumstances of the district." This plan was to be followed until
there should be 5,000 free male inhabitants of full age in the
territory, when a general assembly (governor, council, and representatives) might be established.
I. Extent of Power To "Adopt" Laws
The scheme of legislation under which territorial governors
and judges were to "adopt" laws of the original states was made
applicable to the following territories and was in operation during
the years indicated: Northwest 1788-1798; South (later Tennessee)
I 790-1794; Mississippi 1798-1800; Indiana 1800-1804; Michigan
1805-1823; Illinois 1809-1812. In Louisiana (north of Orleans)
(1804-1812) and in Arkansas (1819), the governor and judges were
authorized to "make" or "pass" laws, and were not, as in the other
territories listed, limited to "adoption" from "original" states.
The extent of the power given by the "adoption" provision
was in dispute from the beginning. In 1788 two of the judges
of Northwest stated to the governor:
Mi

26 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 276 (1928).

355 l!O id. at 252, 253 (19l!4).
356 l!l id. at 670 (19l!4).
357 1 Stat. 51 n.(a).
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"We think it will admit of two constructions. One, that
we can adopt laws of any of the old states literatim et verbatim, mutatis et mutandis for their State only. The other that
we may admit such parts of any particular law as will be
necessary, etc. If so, why will it not admit of another construction, that we may adopt a law, consisting of different
parts of laws of any two or more States upon the same subject?
And if this be granted, surely the diction ought to be rendered uniform." 858
The governor conceded that adoption of parts of a law might
be proper, but disagreed with the view that the governor and
judges might "make" a law consisting of different parts of laws
of different states.359 In 1795, after the United States House of
Representatives had disapproved Northwest laws published in
1792,360 the governor informed the judges that their acts had been
disapproved because they had only power to "adopt," not power
to "make." 361 In 1799, after reciting that it had been represented
that on several occasions laws had been "enacted" by the governor
and judges "of their own authority," and that those laws were of
very doubtful obligation, and had been so spoken of from the
bench, the General Assembly confirmed all laws published prior
to 1795 which had not been repealed. 362
Commencing in 1795 the governor and judges of Northwest
recited in each law published the state from which adopted. From
that time to the establishment of the General Assembly (1799)
the laws published recited adoptions from Connecticut (2); Kentucky (4); Massachusetts (8); New Jersey (I); New York (2); Pennsylvania (27); Virginia (3). Concerning one of the laws adopted
from Kentucky, Salmon P. Chase, in his edition of the Northwest
Statutes, stated in 1833:
"The adoption of this law from the statutes of Kentucky,
which was not one of the original states, was unauthorized
by the ordinance. The law itself, therefore, never was constitutionally in force, within the territory." 368
In an address to the General Assembly in 1799 the governor ob2 THE ST. CLAIR PAPERS 70 (Smith ed. 1882).
Id. at 75.
ANNALS OF CONG., 3d Cong., 2d Sess. 1214, 1227 (1849).
2 THE ST. CLAIR PAPERS 356-57 (Smith ed. 1882).
LAws oF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORY 1788-1800, at 337 (Pease ed. 1925). See also
Governor St. Clair's address to the General Assembly, 2 THE ST. CLAIR. PAPERS 451-53
(Smith ed. 1882).
363 1 STATUTES OF OHIO AND OF THE NORTHWESTERN TERRITORY 205n. (Chase ed. 1833).
358
359
360
361
362
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served: "As Kentucky was not a state when this government was
erected, the validity of the law is very questionable." 364
Chase was also of opinion that the governor and judges had
no power to adopt a repealed law.365 His comment was directed
to the Northwest law of 1795 which had adopted the provisions
of the Virginia Ordinance of 1776. The Ordinance had been
repealed in 1792.
In 1806 the chief judge of the Michigan Supreme Court reported to Secretary Madison the "constructions" which the governor and judges of Michigan had been "compelled" to give to
their powers of legislation:
"The operative words of the ordinance are, the governor
and the judges, or a majority of them, shall adopt and publish
such laws of the original states, civil and criminal, as may be
necessary, and best suited to the circumstances of the district.
"The provision has been deemed to constitute a kind of
legislative board, composed of the governor and the three
judges, any three of whom are considered to form a quorum,
and of which quorum the votes of any two determine a question. . . .
"Under the term laws, all parts of laws have been deemed
to be included. Hence it has not been thought necessary to
adopt the whole of a law from one state. It has been deemed
sufficient that all the parts of any law are sanctioned by the
provisions of some of the states.
"A doubt arose whether the term original states permitted
the adoption of laws from states created subsequent to the
date of the ordinance.
"On this point the construction has been that the term
original, as affecting the territory of Michigan, has the same
force as if used in the act constituting the territory. The states
existing previous to the erection of this territory, have been
deemed, with respect to it, original states; and the very states
which, by their concurrence in this law, originated this territory. Laws have, therefore, been adopted from the states
created since the passage of the ordinance, and anterior to the
erection of the territory; though it has been conceived not
proper to adopt the laws of any state which may be created
subsequent to the establishment of the territory.
"The discretion vested under the term necessary, has been
construed to impart the power of omitting any part of a law
36i
861S

2
1

THE ST. CLAIR PAPERS 453 (Smith ed. 1882).
STATUT.ES OF OHIO AND OF THE NORTHWESTERN TERRITORY

190n. (Chase ed. 1833).
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whatever; and with respect to all geographical designations,
all expressions of time, and of number, all sums of money, all
official or personal descriptions, and some other points of a
similar nature, it has been indispensibly necessary to change,
with perfect latitude, the law adopted, in order to render it,
in any respect, suited to the circumstances of the district.
These terms, therefore, become a formula; which may, in
some measure, apologize to the mind of him who after so
many mutations is scarcely able to recognize in the child
adopted, the lineaments of the parent which gave it birth.
"An express statutory power is given to repeal laws. Hence
a repealing law, becomes a law made, and not a law adopted;
and after any part of a law has been repealed, the repealing
law proceeds to render the remainder of the law consistent
with itself.
"So all legislation exercised under express acts of congress,
ceases to be the adoption, and becomes the making of laws.
"Doubts have existed, whether there was authority to
adopt a law which had been passed by a state, but afterwards
altered or repealed, and how far the repeal of a law by a state,
after its adoption by the territory, affected its subsequent validity. But no cases occurred which rendered it necessary to
decide these questions." 366
The validity of a law "adopted" by the governor and judges
of Michigan from New York, Massachusetts, and Ohio was considered at length by the Supreme Court and the Court of Errors
of New York in 1830 and 1831.367 Most of the "constructions" set
forth in the report to Madison were involved, and the same views
expressed. Sutherland, J., of the New York Supreme Court, remarked:
"It was foreseen that the population of these territories
would be composed of emigrants from the original states,
who, as citizens of those states, had through their representatives in the state legislatures participated in the making of
the laws, which by the ordinance in question, the governor
and judges of the territories were authorized to adopt; this,
together with the power reserved to congress of annulling
such laws as they should disapprove of, was deemed a sufficient guaranty that the interests and wishes of the inhabitants
366 Preface to original Woodward Code (1806), reprinted in 1 TRANSACTIONS OF THE
SUPREJ\IE COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 1805-1814, at xxi-xxii (Blume ed. 1935).
367 Bank of Michigan v. Williams, 5 Wend. 478 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1830), afj'd, 7 Wend.

539 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1831).
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would be regarded in the laws which would be imposed upon
them. The object in view was one of substance, not of
form."3os
A law adopted in Michigan in 1809 369 conferring on justices
of the peace jurisdiction "not exceeding the sum of fifty dollars,"
was held valid, Woodward, J., dissenting. 370 According to Woodward this decision "settles the following principle; that a law authorizing a Summary trial, Without a jury, in cases where the
Value in Controversy exceeds twenty dollars, being adopted from
an original State, is good in a territorial government." 371 The
reference to "twenty dollars" indicates that Woodward was concerned with the seventh amendment to the federal constitution
which had guaranteed jury trial in suits at common law involving
more than twenty dollars. The other judges apparently thought
that the power to adopt was not limited by this provision.

2. Extent of Power To "Make" Laws
The Northwest Ordinance (1787) 372 provided that the General
Assembly (Governor, Legislative Council, and House of Representatives) should have authority "to make laws in all cases for
the government of the district, not repugnant to the principles
and Articles of this Ordinance established and declared." The
same provision, re-enacted by reference, was made applicable to:
the territory South of the Ohio (Tennessee) 1790373 ; Mississippi
1798374 ; Indiana 1800375 ; Michigan 1805376 ; Illinois 1809.377 The
Orleans organic act (1804) 378 declared that the legislative powers
of the governor and council should "extend to all rightful subjects
868 Id. at 485. In 1807 Frederick. Bates, Secretary of Louisiana Territory (a judge
of Michigan Territory 1805-1806), wrote: "The Governor and the Judges make the
laws, as they adopt them in the territories east of the Mississippi. The judges expound
and the Governor executes. This you will say is a violent concentration of powers,
and very unlike the free institutions of your own country. It is true, tho', all things
considered, I do not know that the wit of man could devise an order of affairs better
suited to chasten the irregular habits of those adventurous People who are commonly
found on a frontier." 1 THE LIFE AND PAPERS OF FREDERICK BATES 246 (Marshall ed. 1926).
369 2 LAws OF THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 53 (reprint 1871).
870 Brush v. Buck.len (1809), reported in 1 TRANSACTIONS OF THE SUI'REME COURT OF
THE TERRITORY OF MICHIGAN 1805-1814, at 165 (Blume ed. 1935).
871 Id. at 166.
372 I Stat. 51 n.(a).
873 Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 14, § 1, 1 Stat. 123.
SM Mississippi Territory Act of 1798, ch. 28, § 6, 1 Stat. 550.
871i Act of May 7, 1800, ch. 41, § 2, 2 Stat. 59.
376 Act of 1805 to Divide Indiana Territory, ch. 5, § 2, 2 Stat. 209.
377 Act of 1809 to Divide Indiana Territory, ch. 13, § 2, 2 Stat. 515.
878 Orleans Organic Act of 1804, ch. 38, § 4, 2 Stat. 284.
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of legislation" not "inconsistent with the constitution and laws of
the United States." Summarizing in 1955, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
of the United States Supreme Court pointed out:
"The legislative power of territories has customarily been
expressed as extending to 'all rightful subjects of legislation'
not inconsistent with the Constitution or laws of the United
States. This conventional phrasing was altered to subjects of
'local application,' or 'not locally inapplicable,' in the case of
unincorporated territories such as pre-Commonwealth Puerto
Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Guam." 379
According to Frankfurter, "the United States Constitution, including the Bill of Rights, fully applied to an 'incorporated' territory." To "unincorporated" territories "only some essentials,
withal undefined,'' were extended.380
Civil Liberties. The Northwest Assembly was without power
to "make" laws "repugnant to the principles and Articles" of
the Northwest Ordinance. The "Articles" guaranteed religious
freedom; habeas corpus; trial by jury; proportionate representation in the legislature; judicial proceedings according to the
course of the common law; bail, except in capital cases; moderate
fines; compensation for services or property taken for public use.
The "Articles" prohibited cruel and unusual punishments; deprivation of liberty or property but by judgment of peers or law
of the land; legislative interference with bona fide private contracts; interference with lands and property of Indians; taxation
of nonresidents higher than residents; slavery and involuntary
servitude. All of these protections (except slavery indicated by t)
were extended to: the territory South of the Ohio (Tennessee)
I 790t381 ; Mississippi l 798t382 ; Indiana 1800383 ; Orleans 1805t384 ;
Michigan 1805 385 ; Illinois 1809386 ; Wisconsin 1836387 ; Iowa 1838388 ;
Oregon 1848389 ; Minnesota 1849.390 The organic acts of each of
the following territories provided that the Constitution of the
Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 394 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1955).
Id. at 5.
Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 14, § 1, 1 Stat. 123.
Mississippi Territory Act of 1798, ch. 28, §§ 6, 7, 1 Stat. 550.
Act of May 7, 1800, ch. 41, § 2, 2 Stat. 59.
Orleans Organic Act of 1805, ch. 23, § 1, 2 Stat. 322.
Act of 1805 to Divide Indiana Territory, ch. 5, § 2, 2 Stat. 209.
Act of 1809 to Divide Indiana Territory, ch. 13, § 2, 2 Stat. 515.
387 Wisconsin Organic Act of 1836, ch. 54, § 12, 5 Stat. 15.
388 Iowa Organic Act of 1838, ch. 96, § 12, 5 Stat. 239.
389 Oregon Organic Act of 1848, ch. 177, § 14, 9 Stat. 329.
390 Minnesota Organic Act of 1849, ch. 121, § 12, 9 Stat. 407.
379

380
381
382
383
384
385
386
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United States should extend to and be in force within the territory: New Mexico 1850391 ; Utah 1850 392 ; Kansas 1854393 ; Nebraska
1854394 ; Colorado 186!395 ; Dakota 1861 896 ; Nevada 1861 897 ; Idaho
1863398 ; Montana 1864899 ; Wyoming 1868400 ; Indian 1890401 ;
Oklahoma 1890402; Hawaii 1900403 ; Alaska 1912.404 Bills of rights
(some narrow in scope indicated by t) will be found in the organic acts of: Orleans 1804t405 ; Louisiana (north of Orleans)
1804t406 ; Missouri 1812407 ; Florida 1822t408 ; Philippines 1902409 ;
Puerto Rico 1917410 ; Guam 1950411 ; Virgin Islands 1954.412
The act of March 6, 1820, which provided for the admission
of Missouri Territory as a state, contained this further provision:
"[I]n all that territory ceded by France to the United States,
under the name of Louisiana, which lies north of thirty-six
degrees and thirty minutes north latitude, not included
within the limits of the state, contemplated by this act, slavery
and involuntary servitude, otherwise than in the punishment
of crimes, whereof the parties shall have been duly convicted,
shall be, and is hereby, forever prohibited .
" 418
An act approved June 19, 1862, provided:
"[T]here shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude
in any of the Territories of the United States now existing,
or which may at any time hereafter be formed or acquired
New Mexico Organic Act of 1850, ch. 49, § 17, 9 Stat. 452.
Utah Organic Act of 1850, ch. 51, § 17, 9 Stat. 458.
Nebraska-Kansas Act of 1854, ch. 59, § 32, 10 Stat. 289.
Ibid.
Colorado Organic Act of 1861, ch. 59, § 16, 12 Stat. 176.
Territory of Dakota Act of 1861, ch. 86, § 16, 12 Stat. 244.
397 Nevada Organic Act of 1861, ch. 83, § 16, 12 Stat. 214.
398 Idaho Organic Act of 1863, ch. 117, § 13, 12 Stat. 813.
300 Montana Organic Act of 1864, ch. 95, § 13, 13 Stat. 91.
400 Wyoming Organic Act of 1868, ch. 235, § 16, 15 Stat. 183.
-iOl Oklahoma-Indian Territory Act of 1890, ch. 182, § 28, 26 Stat. 93.
402 Ibid.
403 Hawaiian Organic Act of 1900, ch. 339, § 5, 31 Stat. 141.
404 Alaska Government Act of 1912, ch. 387, § 3, 37 Stat. 512.
-i05 Orleans Organic Act of 1804, ch. 38, 2 Stat. 283.
406 Ibid.
-i07 Missouri Organic Act of 1812, ch. 95, § 14, 2 Stat. 747.
-i08 Florida Organic Act of 1822, ch. 13, § 10, 3 Stat. 658.
400 Philippine Government Act of 1902, ch. 1369, § 5, 32 Stat. 692.
oo Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act of 1917 Gones Act), ch. 145, § 2, 39 Stat. 951.
-ill Organic Act of Guam § 5, 64 Stat. 385 (1950), 48 U.S.C. § 1421b (1958).
412 Revised Organic Act of the Virgin Islands § 3, 68 Stat. 497 (1954), 48 U.S.C.
1561 (1958).
-il3 Missouri Enabling Act of 1820 (Missouri Compromise), ch. 22, § 8, 3 Stat. 548.
301
302
393
304
805
396

§

530

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

b~ the United States, otherwise than m punishment of
crimes . . . ." 414
An act approved March 2, 1867, provided:
"[T]he holding of any person to service or labor under the
system known as peonage is hereby declared to be unlawful,
and the same is hereby abolished and forever forbidden in
the Territory of New Mexico, or in any other Territory or
State of the United States ...." 415
In Dred Scott v. Sandford416 one of the great questions was whether
Congress had power to exclude slavery from the territories. It
took a war to settle that question.
Primary Disposal of Soil. The Orleans organic act (1804) 417
declared: "The governor or legislative council shall have no power
over the primary disposal of the soil, nor to tax the lands of the
United States, nor to interfere with the claims to land within the
said territory." Similar restrictions will be found among provisions common to all territories in force December l, 1873.418 The
Constitution419 had given Congress "power to dispose of and make
all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other
property belonging to the United States," and Congress never
saw fit to delegate to territorial legislatures control of federal land.
The entire territorial development was a gigantic land operation
in which the federal government acquired title to vast areas of
new land, and sold them in parcels to individual settlers.
Equal Taxation. The provision of the Northwest Ordinance
that in no case should "nonresident proprietors be taxed higher
than residents" was one of the provisions common to all territories in force December I, 1873.420 A provision requiring equal
and uniform taxes will be found in the Oregon organic act
(1848),421 and in the organic acts of several other territories including Washington (1853),422 Colorado (1861), 423 Wyoming
(1868),424 and Oklahoma (1890). 425
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425

Act of June 19, 1862, ch. 110, 12 Stat. 432.
Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 187, § 1, 14 Stat. 546.
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
Orleans Organic Act of 1804, ch. 38, § 4, 2 Stat. 284.
REv. STAT. § 1851 (1875).
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
REv. STAT. § 1851 (1875).
Oregon Organic Act of 1848, ch. 177, § 6, 9 Stat. 325.
Washington Organic Act of 1853, ch. 90, § 6, 10 Stat. 175.
Colorado Organic Act of 1861, ch. 59, § 6, 12 Stat. 174.
Wyoming Organic Act of 1868, ch. 235, § 6, 15 Stat. 180.
Oklahoma-Indian Territory Act of 1890, ch. 182, § 6, 26 Stat. 84.
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Local or Special Laws. An act applicable to all territories
passed in 1867426 provided that "the legislative assemblies of the
several territories" should not grant "private charters or especial
privileges," but might permit incorporation for specified purposes by "general incorporation acts." This statute was supplemented in 1872.427 In 1885 Congress declared: "[T]he legislatures
of the Territories of the United States now or hereafter to be
organized shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following enumerated cases ...." 428
After listing two dozen "cases" in which local or special laws
should not be passed, the statute provided: "In all other cases
where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall
be enacted in any of the Territories of the United States by the
Territorial legislatures thereof." 429
The first of the "cases" listed in the above statute was "granting divorces." In 1888430 the Supreme Court of the United States
was called upon to decide the validity of a divorce granted by
legislative act in Oregon in 1852. After a review of the history
of legislative divorce, the Court held that power to grant divorces
was included when Congress provided that Oregon's legislative
power should "extend to all rightful subjects of legislation not
inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States."
A consideration of the validity of a divorce law passed by an unincorporated territory is contained in Granville-Smith v. GranvilleSmith.431
Other Limitations. Limiting provisions other than those
mentioned above, if listed, would come under the heading "Miscellaneous." An example is the act of 1873432 which prohibited
compensation to officers or members of any territorial legislature
"other than that provided by the laws of the United States." An
illustration of a special limitation on the legislative power of a
single territory will be found in an act passed in 1887 declaring
that it should not be lawful for the legislature of Utah to create,
organize, or recognize an emigrating company. 433
426
427
428
429

430
431
432
433

Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 150, § I, 14 Stat. 426.
Act of June IO, 1872, ch. 434, 17 Stat. 390, amended by 23 Stat. 348 (1885).
24 Stat. 170 (1886), 48 U.S.C. § 1471 (1958).
Ibid.
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
349 U.S. 1 (1955).
Act of Jan. 23, 1873, ch. 48, § 4, 17 Stat. 416.
Anti-Polygamy Act of 1887, ch. 397, § 15, 24 Stat. 637.
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INFLUENCE OF THE FRONTIER

The Northwest Ordinance (1787) 434 provided that the governor and judges of the territory should "adopt and publish"
laws "necessary and best suited to the circumstances of the district."
"This provision evidently refers to the selection of single
acts from the statutes of the states, with reference to the
adaptation of each act to the circumstances of a new country.
It was plainly the intention of Congress, also, that each law
adopted should be published, that every citizen might know
the nature and extent of his social obligations. Neither of
these purposes could be answered by the adoption of the
English law, written and unwritten, in the mass. Its adaptation to the circumstances of the district could not be ascertained; nor could the citizen be acquainted with its nature
by publication." 485
This statement, made by Salmon P. Chase while editing the
Northwest and Ohio statutes in 1833, gives us the prime essentials
of frontier law: (1) adaptation to frontier conditions, and (2) local
publication. His reference to "English law, written and unwritten, in the mass" was to the Northwest Statute of 1795486 (adopted
from Virginia) which had declared that the common law of England and statutes made in aid of the common law prior to 1607
should be the rule of decision. He stated that it was still a "contested question, whether the English statutes and common law
acquired a binding force upon the people of the northwest territory, in consequence of the adoption of this act."
The Michigan repealing act of 1810 commenced with a preamble (similar to that of the Virginia repealing act of 1792) which
read:
"Whereas the good people of the territory of Michigan,
may be ensnared by ignorance of acts of the parliament of
England, and of acts of the parliament of Great Britain, which
are not published among the laws of the territory, and it has
been thought advisable by the governor and the judges of the
territory of Michigan, hereafter specially to enact such of the
said acts as shall appear worthy of adoption ...." 437
484
485
436
487

1 Stat. 51 n.(a).
1 CHASE 190n.
Ibid.; PEASE 253.
1 LAws OF THE TERRITORY

OF MICHIGAN

900 (reprint 1871).

1963]

TERRITORIAL COURTS AND LAW

533

The emphasis here was on legislative selection, and local publication. If left to the courts to decide in particular cases which English statutes were to be considered in force, years might pass
before the inhabitants would know what statute law governed
their affairs. And in the absence of published court reports the
judicial selections when made would not be widely known. Even
when known that a particular English statute had been declared
in force the text of the statute in most frontier communities
would be unavailable. The fact that settlers in the territories came
from different states and could not bring their law with them
made local publication of all applicable statute law highly desirable, if not essential.
Keenly aware of the necessity of having all statutory law locally
available in printed form, the frontier territories were quick to
adopt codes based on the New York (Field) Code of Procedure of
1848. Field's Civil Code, rejected in New York, was first adopted
in Dakota. Congress encouraged local publication by bearing the
expense.438
In Part I of this article439 attention was called to observations
made by Alexis de Tocqueville after conversations with Ohio
lawyers, including Salmon P. Chase, in 1831:
"A defective English law (and there are many) is imported into America by the first emigrants. They modify
it, adapt it after a fashion to their social condition; but they
still retain for it a superstitious respect, and are unable to
rid themselves of it entirely. The second emigration takes
place; these same men plunge once again into the wilderness.
This time the law is modified in such a way that it has almost lost the stamp of its origin. But it requires still a third
emigration before it ceases to exist."440
The "second emigration" referred to was out of the original
states into the Ohio and Mississippi valleys. "Superstitious re438 In 1792 Congress provided "That the laws of the territory northwest of the river
Ohio, that have been or hereafter may be enacted by the governor and judges thereof,
shall be printed under the direction of the Secretary of State, and two hundred copies
thereof, together with ten sets of the laws of the United States, shall be delivered to
the said governor and judges, to be distributed among the inhabitants for their information ••• .'' Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 42, § I, I Stat. 285. In 1872 expense for printing
laws, journals, etc., for any session of a territorial legislature was limited to $4,000.
Appropriations Act of 1872, ch. 140, 17 Stat. 73. POMEROY, THE TERRITORIES AND THE
UNITED STATES 1861-1890-STUDIES IN COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION 45 (1947), states: "Legislatures expected and sometimes received contributions toward large printing bills, as
for revisions and codes of laws."
430 Blume&: Brown, Territorial Courts and Law: I, 61 MICH. L. REv. 39 (1962).
440 Id. at 89.
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spect" for English law was no doubt lost in this great migration,
but the law in force lacked much of losing "the stamp of its
origin." And the same was true of the "third emigration" out of
the Mississippi Valley to the Pacific. Persons willing to leave
settled communities with their established legal systems were
ready to make adjustments to new physical conditions, and were
not inclined to hesitate to change the law of their ancestors to
meet those conditions.
In an address to the Wisconsin Bar Association in 1921 on
the "Influence of Frontier Life on the Development of American
Law," Professor Frederick L. Paxon stated:
"In older settled, established communities we put up
with obsolete conditions, with laws that cease to fulfill a
useful purpose, with institutions that have become cumbersome instead of profitable. We keep putting up with
them, because to change would be an annoyance and a nuisance, and because one can never be quite sure in lopping
off a governmental appendix. that something else won't be
lopped off with it that will leave the system weaker instead
of stronger for the operation. But in these new communities,
where they started with a great long table and a big white
sheet of paper and abundance of ink, with no solicitation as
to what they should write or should not, it was easy to cut out
institutions of government and to substitute others that they
desired and approved. The 13 colonies did this, and then
after independence they allowed every new colony to do the
same." 441
Insofar as this statement implies that "every new colony" was
free to pass any laws it saw fit, it is misleading, and cannot be
supported. Territorial legislative power was restricted in extent,
and all laws passed were subject to disapproval by Congress. In
some of the early territories laws could not be "made" but had to
be "adopted" from original states. It was true, however, that the
organization of each new territorial government meant a new
consideration of what law should be in force. And as suggested
by Professor Paxon there were no established institutions which
the legislators might hesitate to change.
Looking beyond particular developments such as mining and
441 13 PROCEEDINGS OF THE STATE BAR AssocIATION OF WISCONSIN 477, 484 (1921);
quoted in part in AUlliANN, THE CHANGING AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM: SOME SELECTED
PHASES 15 (1940); not included in PAXON, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN FRONTIER (student
ed. 1924).
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water laws made by trespassers to regulate the affairs of trespassers,
and detailed modification of rules originally English to suit frontier conditions, we find two general attitudes and resultant influences attributable to frontier life: (1) A strong desire to have
all statute law published locally so that reliance on laws not
available on the frontier would be unnecessary--codes were welcome; (2) A lack of "superstitious respect" for old laws and legal
institutions; in other words, a readiness to make changes to suit
new conditions.
APPENDIX
The Virginia "revisals" initiated by Jefferson required a rewriting of all English
statutes considered "worthy of adoption." (See text at note 350 supra.) The extent to
which the subject matter of English statutes was covered by Virginia revised statutes
is indicated by the following side-margin references in the Virginia Revised Code 1819
(2 vols.) to "the English statutes in pari materia." References are to volume and page
of the Code. Dates and references in parentheses are added to conform to Statutes of
the Realm. References to the sections of the English statutes are omitted.
9 Hen.3 (1224-5)
Magna carta
c.7, Dower, I:403
c.29(39), Judgment of peers, I:595
20 Hen.3 (1235-6)
St.Merton
c.l, Dower, I:403
52 Hen.3 (1267)
St.Marlb.
c.3, Distress, I:447
c.4, Distress, I:453
c.24(23), Waste, I:462
3 Edw.l (1275)
St.Westm.l
c.10, Coroners, I:286
c.26, Extortion, I:560
c.27, Extortion, I:560
c.30, Extortion, I:560
c.49, Dower, I:403
4 Edw.l (1275-6)
St.2 Off.Coron.
Coroners, I:288,290
St.2 Glouc. (Bigamy)
c.6, Warranty, I:368
6 Edw.l (1278)
St.Glouc.
c.(l) Costs, I:474
c.5, Waste, I:463
13 Edw.l (1285)
St.Westm.2
c.3, Right of entry, I:514
c.4, Dower, I:404
c.4, Reversion, I:514
c.7, Dower, I:404
c.14, Waste, I:463
c.18, Elegit, I:525

20
33

34
4
2
4
5
14

25

c.22, ·waste, I:463
c.31, Bill of exceptions, I:523
c.34, Rape, I:585
c.34(4), Dower, I:404
Edw.l (1291-2)
St.2 St. Waste
Waste, 1:463
Edw.1 (1305)
(Ord. de conspir.)
St.2, Conspirators, I:558
St.2, Champerty, I:558
St.3, Champerty, I:558
Edw.l (1306)
St.de conjunc.feoff.
St.I, Plea of joint-tenancy, I:496
Edw.2, St.2, I:288 (should read: 4 Edw.l,
St. 2, Coroners)
Edw.3 (1328)
St.Northamp.
c.3, Affrays, I:554
Edw.3 (1330)
c.7, Action for wrongs done to decedent,
I:390
Edw.3 (1331)
c.10, Embracery, I:572
Edw.3 (1340)
St.I
c.6, Jeofails, I:512
c.8, Escheators, I:294
Edw.3 (1351-2)
St.1(5)
c.16, Abatement, I:496
St.5
c.2, Treason, I:591
c.5, Executors, I:390
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27 Edw.3 (1353)
19 Hen.7 (1503-4)
St.2
c.13, Riots, 1:557
c.10, Weights and measures, II:119
c.20, Expos.St.Glouc., Costs, I: 494
28 Edw. (1354)
1 Hen.8 (1509-10)
c.6, Coroners, I:286
c.8, Escheators, 1:294
31 Edw.3 (1357) (St.I)
c.10, Escheators, 1:295,298
c.11, Administrators, I:382
21 Hen.8 (1529)
34 Edw.3 (1360-1)
c.4, Executors, 1:388
c.8, Embracery, I:572
c.5, Administrators, 1:382
c.13, Escheators, I:294
23 Hen.8 (1531-2)
36 Edw.3 (1362)
c.15, Costs, 1:481,494
c.18(13), Escheators, I:295
24 Hen.8 (1532-3)
38 Edw.3 (1363-4)
c.8, Costs, 1:494
St.I
25 Hen.8 (1533-4)
c.12, Embracery, I:572
c.6, Buggery, 1:586
42 Edw.3 (1368)
27 Hen.8 (1535-6)
c.5, Escheators, I:294
c.10, Uses, I:370
5 Rich.2 (1381)
c.10, Dower, I:404,405
(St.I)
31 Hen.8 (1539)
c.8(7), Forcible entries, I:455 footnote
c.l, Partition, 1:359
13 Rich.2 (1389-90)
32 Hen.8 (1540)
(St.I)
c.l, Wills, 1:375
c.9, Weights and measures, II:119
c.2, Limitations, 1:488
15 Rich.2 (1391)
c.5, Executions, 1:527
c.2, Forcible entries, I:455 footnote
c.9, Maintenance, 1:375
c.4, Weights and measures, II:119
c.28, Right of entry, 1:514
16 Rich.2 (1392-3)
c.30, Jeofails, 1:511
c.3, Weights and measures, II:119
c.32, Partition, 1:359
13 Hen.4 (1411)
c.33, Right of entry, 1:514
c.7, Riots, 1:556
c.34, Reversions, 1:452
c.37, Executors; Distress, 1:453
7 Hen.5 (1419)
(c.l), Conspirators, 1:558
33 Hen.8 (1541-2)
c.l, Counterfeiting, 1:577
9 Hen.5 (1421)
(St.I)
34 &: 35 Hen.8 (1542-3)
c.4, Jeofails, I:512
c.5, Wills, I:375
8 Hen.6 (I 429)
37 Hen.8 (1545)
c.5, Weights and measures, II:119
c.8, Horse-stealers, 1:575
c.9, Forcible entries, 1:455 footnote
c.9, Usury, 1:374
c.12, Jeofails, I:512
1 Edw.6 (1547)
c.15, Jeofails, 1:512
c.12, Horse-stealers, 1:575
c.16, Escheators, I:294,295,296
c.12, Treason, 1:591
6(11) Hen.6 (1433)
2 &: 3 Edw.6 (1548)
c.5, Waste, 1:463
c.8, Escheators, 1:298
11 Hen.6 (1433)
c.32, perpetuating 32 Hen.8, c.30, Jeoc.8, Weights and measures, II:119
fails, 1:511
c.33, Horse-stealers, 1:575
18 Hen.6 (1439)
c.7, Escheators, 1:294
5 &: 6 Edw.6 (1551-2)
c.11, Treason, 1:591
3 Hen.7 (1487)
c.16, Buying and selling offices, 1:559
c.2, Abduction, 1:402
1 &: 2 Phil. and Mar. (1554 &: 1554-5)
3 Hen.8(7} (1487}
c.13, Coroners, 1:290
c.10, Expos.St.Glouc.,Costs, I:494
4&:5 Phil. and Mar. (1557-8)
4 Hen.7 (1488-9)
c.8, Abduction, 1:402
c.20, Actions popular, 1:615
5 Eliz. (1562-3)
11 Hen.7 (1495)
c.9, Witnesses, 1:517
c.7(4), Weights and measures, II:119
c.9, Perjury, 1:571
c.12, Pauper suits, 1:481
c.17, perpetuates 25 Hen.8, c.6, Bug12 Hen.7 (1496-7)
gery, 1:586
c.5, Weights and measures, II:119
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13 Eliz. (1571)
c.5, Fraudulent conveyances, I:372,373
c.8, Usury, I:374
18 Eliz. (1575-6)
c.5, Compounding offenses, I:616
c.7, Rape, I:585
c.14, perpetuates 32 Hen.8, c.30, Jeofails, I :511
27 Eliz. (1584-5)
c.4, Fraudulent conveyances, I:372,373
c.5, Jeofails, I:511
31 Eliz. (1588-9)
c.11, Forcible entries, I:455 footnote
29(39) Eliz. (1597-8)
c.18, Usury, I:374
43 Eliz. (1601)
c.6, Costs, I:493
I Jae.I (1603-4)
c.11, Bigamy, I:400
4 Jae.I (1606-7)
c.3, Expos.St.Glaue. 6 Ed.I, Costs, I:494
21 Jae.I (1623-4)
c.13, perpetuates 32 Hen.8, c.30, Jeofails,
I:511
c.15, Forcible entries, I:455 footnote
c.16, Limitations, I:487,488,490,491
c.16, Costs; Vexatious suits, I:493
c.17, Usury, I:374
c.24, Executions, I:528
3 Car.I (1627)
c.4(5), Usury, I:374
c.4(5), continues 43 Eliz., c.6, Costs,
I:493
16 Car.I (1640)
c.4, continues 43 Eliz., c.6, Costs, I:493
12 Car.2 (1660)
c.24, Guardians, I:405
16 Car.2 (1664)
c.7, Gaming, I:563,564
16&:17 Car. 2 (1664&:5)
c.5, Executions, I:527,528
c.8, perpetuates 32 Hen.8, c.30, Jeofails,
I:511
22 Car.2 (1670)
c.8, Weights and measures, II:119
22 &: 23 Car.2 (1670 &: 1)
c.2, perpetuating 16 &: 17 Car.2, c.5, Executions, I:527
c.9, Costs, I:493
c.10, Intestacy, I:383,383,389
c.12, Weights and measures, II:119
29 Car.2 (1677)
c.3, Trusts, I:370
c.3, Executions, 1:529
c.3, Frauds, I:372
c.3, Wills, I:375,376,377,379,389
c.3, Intestacy, I:382, 389
c.7, Process on Sunday, I:281
30 Car.2 (1678)
c.7, Executors, I:390
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31 Car.2 (1679)
c.2, Habeas corpus, I:468,469,470
32(31) Car.2 (1679)
c.2, Habeas corpus, I:471
I J ac.2 (1685)
c.17, Intestacy, I:382
2 Gui. &: Mar. (1689)
St.I
c.5, Distress, I:446,447
3 Gui. & Mar. (1691)
c.4(14), Fraudulent devises, I:391,392,393
4 & 5(4) Gui. &: Mar. (1692)
c.24, Executors, I:390
6 Gul.3 (6 & 7 Gul. & Mar.) (1694)
c.14, perpetuating 3 Gui. & Mar. c.4(14),
Fraudulent devises, I:391
7(& 8) Gul.3 (1695-6)
c.3, Treason, I:591
8 & 9 Gul.3 (1696-7)
c.11, Costs, I:493
c.11, Abatement, I:497
c.11, Vexatious suits, I:509
c.31, Partition, I:360
9 & 10(9) Gul.3 (1697-8)
c.15, Arbitration, I:454
c.17, Bills of exchange, I:483
IO Gul.3 (1698)
c.14(2), Limitations, I:493
10& 11(10) Gul.3 (1698)
c.16(22), Contingent remainder, I:369
13 & 14(11) Gul.3 (1698-9)
c.15, Weights and measures, II:119
1 Ann. (1702)
St.I
c.15, Weights and measures, II:119
St.2
c.9 Accessaries, I:589
4(& 5) Ann. (1705)
c.16(3), Warranty, I:368
c.16(3), Reversions, I:370
c.16(3), Limitations, I:491
c.16(3), Actions of account, I:509
4 & 5 Ann. (1705)
c.16(3), Actions on bonds, I:509
c.16(3), Pleading several matters, I:510
c.16(3), perpetuates 32 Hen.8, c.30, Jeofails, I:511
5(6) Ann. (1706)
c.31, Accessaries, I:589
7 Ann. (1708)
c.19, Deeds, I:204
c.19, Guardians, I:408
8 Ann. (1709)
c.14(18), Distress, I:488,450,451
9 Ann. (l710)
c.14(19), Gaming, I:561,562,563,564
12(13) Ann. (l713)
St.2
c.16(15) Usury, I:374
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12 Geo.I (1725)•
c.29, Process, I:499
2 Geo.2 (1729)•
c.22, Set-off, I:487, 510
5 Geo.2 (1732)•
c.13(?), Jeofails, I:512
c.25, Pro confesso, I:214
8 Geo.2 (1735)•
c.24, Set-off, I:487,510
II Geo.2 (1728)•
c.19, Attomment, I:370
c.19, Distress, I:450
c.19, Replevin, I:451
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14 Geo.2 (1741)•
c.20, Intestacy; Wills, I:389
18 Geo.2 (1745)•
c.34, Gaming, I:562
21 Geo.2 (1748)•
c.27(3), perpetuates 12 Geo.I, c.29, Process, I:499
25 Geo.2 (1752)•
c.6, Wills, I:377
29 Geo.2 (1756)•
c.31, Guardians, I:408,417
30 Geo.2 (1757)•
c.24(?), Gaming, I:563

• Subsequent to Statutes of the Realm. Dates and references in parentheses added
to conform to Statutes at Large.

